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ABSTRACT 
A primary motivation for this study is to identify a key set of policy options for improving fertilizer 
markets in West Africa (among Economic Community of West African States member countries) in ways 
that ultimately will help improve the efficiency of regional markets and lower the transaction costs and 
fiscal burdens of increasing fertilizer use in the region. Guided by the 2008 fertilizer crisis, many 
governments are tempted to impose fertilizer subsidies to reduce fertilizer prices. Yet, in an environment 
riddled with inefficiencies that contribute to the high costs of using fertilizers, the introduction of subsidies 
only adds more fiscal burden.  
To carry out the study, we undertook four country case studies to review the key constraints and 
bottlenecks along the fertilizer supply chain. The countries were Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal, and 
the research included field visits in 2009 and 2010. The current paper is based on the country case study 
results, complemented by a literature review and analysis of secondary data sources.  
Keywords:  fertilizer use and supply, regional market integration, supply chain, improved 
technology, policy environment, structure and performance of markets, harmonization of products 
and regulations, common fertilizer market vii 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
As countries in West Africa strive to achieve annual growth rates of 6 percent in their agricultural sectors’ 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as part of their commitment to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP) of the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 
the enormous task is going to be raising agricultural productivity in order to meet these targets, especially 
with growing population and urbanization. Productivity gains will depend on the extent to which countries 
can increase crop yields each year at much faster rates than they have in the past.  
Increasing crop yields in West Africa is a daunting task considering the diversity of agroecologies 
and the numerous constraints that affect agricultural performance, including soil nutrient depletion. Much 
of West African agriculture remains heavily reliant on traditional production systems and natural methods 
for soil fertility maintenance. The lack of agricultural intensification or enhancing crop production by 
raising crop yields rather than expanding cultivated area in West Africa, as in most other regions of Sub-
Saharan Africa, is generally explained by poor access to extension, risks associated with adopting an 
improved technology, the high cost of inputs, poor access to finance, and seasonal labor constraints (Feder, 
Just, and Zilberman 1985). Among the many reasons why resource-poor farmers do not purchase fertilizer, 
for example, are high fertilizer prices, poor access to rural finance and extension services, rainfall 
uncertainty, poor infrastructure, and underdeveloped input and output markets. Such conditions affect 
millions in the smallholder farming sector, resulting in thin fertilizer markets in West Africa.  
The situation of thin fertilizer markets and low fertilizer use in West Africa was exacerbated by the 2008 
fertilizer crisis, when fertilizer prices increased as much as fourfold over a relatively short time span 
(Figure 1.1). The crisis affected fertilizer-sector operations at both the macro and micro levels. At the 
macro level, it increased the amount of foreign exchange needed to import the same basket of fertilizers. 
At the micro level, it threatened to dramatically reduce access to fertilizer by smallholder farmers. To 
prevent a drop in fertilizer use and food production, and thus the threat of food insecurity, many countries 
introduced fertilizer subsidies to reduce fertilizer prices at the farm level. From a policy perspective, the 
potential decline in fertilizer use also threatened the Abuja Declaration’s goal of achieving fertilizer use 
levels of 50 kilograms/hectare (kg/ha) by 2015 from average levels of 8 kg/ha in 2006.
1  
Although subsidies can help increase fertilizer demand, they come at a great fiscal cost to national 
budgets, a cost many countries in the region can ill afford as they divert scarce public resources from much 
needed longer-term investments (such as market development, research and extension, infrastructure 
improvement, technology transfer, and rural services).
2 To make matters worse, as long as inefficiencies 
persist in fertilizer markets and distribution systems, introducing a price subsidy ultimately subsidizes 
those inefficiencies.  
                                                      
1 These target goals were set in June 2006, when the African Union Special Summit of the Heads of State and Government 
adopted the 12-point Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for an African Green Revolution. To achieve the target, fertilizer use would 
have to grow by about 30 percent per year to 2015. 
2 Our purpose is not to review the pros and cons of subsidies; a substantial amount of literature exists on that topic (see 
Morris et al. 2007, IFDC 2003, and associated background papers).  2 
Figure 1.1— Global fertilizer prices (FOB, bulk), monthly averages (January 2007 – January 2011) 
 
Source: 
1. Derived from Green Markets (http://greenmarkets.pf.com). 
2. Derived from Fertilizer Market Bulletin (FMB) Weekly 
Fertilizer Reports. 
Notes: World fertilizer prices doubled in 2007 and reached all-time highs in April 2008. But prices began dropping dramatically in 
October and November, 2008. FOB = free on board (average price, with buyer paying freight and insurance, to destination port). 
DAP = diammonium phosphate. MOP = muriate of potash.   
Nature and Scope of the Study 
The primary goal of the paper, therefore, is to determine to what extent such inefficiencies and bottlenecks 
exist, identify areas where fertilizer supply chain costs can be reduced, and given this analysis and review, 
offer a number of policy options to improve the functioning of fertilizer markets in West Africa. In this 
context, we hope the identification of such cost-reduction measures will ultimately contribute to policy 
actions that not only increase the demand for fertilizers but also lower the fiscal burden of smart subsidy 
(purchasing power support) for vulnerable groups wherever it is needed. 
For the purposes of the study, West Africa is defined as the geographical area covering the 15 
member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (Figure 1.2). The study is based on secondary data available from 
different sources (the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], the International 
Fertilizer Development Center [IFDC], and the International Food Policy Research Institute [IFPRI]) as 
well as on data collected during field visits to four countries—two francophone countries (Mali and 
Senegal) and two anglophone countries (Ghana and Nigeria). This sample also reflects issues faced by 
landlocked (Mali) and coastal (Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria) countries. These four countries represent 
almost 70 percent of the fertilizer market in West Africa, according to a three-year average between 2006 
and 2008 [FAO 2010. However, results and findings drawn from this sample are used as indicative of 
broader issues affecting the development of regional or multi-country fertilizer markets in West Africa. 
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Source: Author’s creation. 
Outline of the Report 
First we review the performance of the agricultural sector and the role of fertilizer to highlight some of the 
key constraints to agricultural intensification and productivity growth in explaining the critical role of 
fertilizer (Section 2). In Section 3 we present overall trends associated with fertilizer markets in the region 
in terms of consumption, production, and trade patterns, as well as an overview of their performance. We 
delve deeper, in Section 4, into evaluating the markets along the entire supply chain for Ghana, Mali, 
Nigeria, and Senegal. The functioning of fertilizer markets, using the structure, conduct, and performance 
(S-C-F) approach is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 then identifies the key constraints affecting the supply 
chain and is followed in Section 7 by a range of policy, institutional, and infrastructural considerations for 
improving both domestic and regional markets. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a key recommendation 
for the way forward—the promotion of a common regional fertilizer market in West Africa. 4 
2.  ROLE OF FERTILIZER IN WEST AFRICAN AGRICULTURE 
Although a general consensus exists on the need to improve agricultural performance in West Africa to 
achieve economic growth, poverty reduction, and food security, the challenge at hand has been about how 
to do it (ECOWAS 2009). We review some of the challenges here from both a goal perspective and an 
agronomic and economic perspective, especially in terms of achieving a rapid uptake of agricultural 
intensification methods and use of fertilizer. This is intended to help set the context for understanding the 
underlying goals and challenges facing West African agriculture, in general, and the factors affecting the 
demand for fertilizer, in particular. After all, the underlying demand for fertilizer is derived not only by its 
own price but also by other factors that affect farm profitability: yield response, output prices, other 
production costs, policy and institutional environment, and production and market risks. The rest of the 
paper then pays more attention to the fertilizer supply chain to arrive at some explicit policy 
recommendations for removing key constraints and bottlenecks along the supply chain (from port to 
farmgate), and thus lowering fertilizer’s price and inducing its demand. 
The Importance of Agriculture in West Africa 
The population in the ECOWAS region of West Africa is projected to almost double over the next 15 
years, from 230 million in 2010 to 430 million by 2025 (FAO 2010). Of this number, more than 60 percent 
are projected to reside in urban areas, with an increased number of towns and cities exceeding 100,000 
persons (Johnson et al. 2008). Such growth is expected to put immense pressure on the ability of West 
African agriculture to meet the growing demand for food staples and maintain stability in domestic and 
regional food security systems. At the same time, production of food staples plays equally important roles 
in reducing hunger and poverty and contributing to overall economic growth in the region (Diao, Headey, 
and Johnson 2008). This is because foodcrop production in West Africa is dominated by millions of 
smallholder farmers, many of whom are resource poor, who stand to benefit from increased output both for 
their own consumption and for earning income. Similarly, the majority of the poor in the nonfarm sector 
(both rural and urban areas) typically spend a large portion of their income on food, and they therefore also 
stand to benefit from lower food prices. Finally, the contribution of food staple production to overall 
economic growth in many countries in the region is driven by the sector’s strong production and 
consumption linkages with other sectors in the economy (Delgado, Hopkins, and Kelly 1998; Diao et al. 
2007). 
The key challenges for agriculture in West Africa are the continued heavy reliance on traditional 
rainfed production systems and practices of soil fertility maintenance, as well as poor access to markets. 
Consequently, the presence of high production and marketing risks and limited access to rural services and 
institutions (credit and extension, market information) invariably contribute to limited adoption of modern 
inputs, such as fertilizer, improved seeds, and machinery (Crawford et al. 2006).  
West African policymakers are well aware of the important role food staples, and agriculture in 
general, play in driving future growth and food security in the region as evident in their commitments to 
raising productivity and growth in the sector. For example, in aligning their own sector strategies to the 
CAADP agenda of the African Union/New Partnership for Africa’s Development, many countries in the 
region have committed to an agricultural growth target of 6 percent per annum, against a historical growth 
rate of more than 3 percent (Table 2.1 below), in order to achieve the UN’s Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) of halving hunger and poverty by 2015 (vis-à-vis 1990). Additionally, at the African Union level, 
member states have also set a shared target of increasing fertilizer nutrient use from 8 kg/ha in 2006 (and 
2008 as well) to 50 kg/ha by 2015. The key challenge now is how to make all this happen.  
According to estimates by Johnson et al. (2008), to achieve the MDG of halving poverty by 2015, 
agriculture in West Africa will need to grow by 6.8 percent annually; and for that to happen, spending in 
agriculture will need to increase from $6.6 billion
3 in 2004 to $31.8 billion by 2015, translating into an 
                                                      
3 All dollars ($) are in US dollars. 5 
annual growth in spending of 20 percent or more per year.  Particular attention will need to focus on 
increasing productivity through the adoption of yield-enhancing technologies (for example, fertilizer and 
improved seeds) and promoting greater integration of regional food staple markets. Simply expanding the 
area under cultivation is no longer a viable option in much of the region. Without replenishing the soils on 
current cultivated lands with nutrients, crop yields and sector growth will decline, increasing the likelihood 
that more people will fall into poverty. This is evident in the lackluster performance of crop yields in the 
region on aggregate. 
Table 2.1—Average annual agricultural GDP growth rates, 1980–2009 (%) 
Country  1980–1989  1990–1999  2000–2009 
    Cote d’Ivoire  -0.4  3.2  1.4 
Cape Verde  2.7  4.2  1.6 
Senegal  2.5  2.1  1.7 
Togo  5.7  4.5  2.9 
Niger  1.8  3.6  2.9 
Gambia, The  1.2  2.2  3.0 
Ghana  0.9  3.3  3.7 
Guinea-Bissau  5.0  4.3  4.4 
Benin  5.2  5.8  4.6 
Mali  2.6  3.1  4.6 
Burkina Faso  3.6  6.4  6.0 
Guinea  3.7  4.4  9.3 
        West Africa  1.8  3.7  3.7 
        Source: Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS), using World Development Indicators database.  
Crop Yield Performance and Unrealized Potential  
Average crop yields in West Africa are significantly lower than global averages—over one third for paddy 
rice and two-fifths for maize and cassava (Figure 2.1). Additionally, their rate of growth over time has 
barely kept up with population growth. Cereal production in West Africa increased from 14.3 million tons
4 
in 1980 to 51.5 million tons in 2009, an annual growth of 4.4 percent (Table 2.2). That growth rate is 
marginally above the rate of population growth. However, growth in cereal production during the 1990s 
was lower than that of population, thereby adding to hunger and poverty. In 2000, more than 50 percent of 
people lived below the international poverty line ($1 per day) in West Africa.  
   
                                                      
4 All tons are metric tons. 6 




Source: Author’s creation based on data from FAO 2010. 



















































































































































































































Table 2.2—Average annual growth in cereal production in West Africa, 1980–2009 (%) 
  Cereals  Cassava 
Period  Area  Yield  Production  Area  Yield  Production 
1980–1990  5.8  0.6  6.4  3.1  1.5  4.6 
1990–2000  0.9  1.0  1.9  6.3  (0.2)  6.1 
2000–2009  2.1  3.0  5.1  2.1  2.0  4.1 
1980–2009  2.9  1.5  4.4  4.0  1.0  5.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in FAO 2010. 
Most of the growth in cereal production has occurred from the expansion of cultivated area (Figure 
2.2 below) and reduced fallow. Approximately two-thirds of production growth was accounted for by area 
growth and a third by yield growth. During the 1990s, growth in both area and yield was modest—1 
percent or less per annum. Slow growth in production was a result of decreased input use due to high input 
prices resulting from devaluation, subsidy removal, and divesture of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
involved in input distribution. However, during 2000–2009, the contribution of yield (3 percent per year) 
was higher than that of area (2.1 percent per year). After 2000, the establishment of private-sector-based 
input supply systems, policy reforms in the 1990s, and incentives from rising crop prices may have 
contributed to efficient use of inputs and yield increases, but that has not been fully substantiated except 
for overall sector productivity more generally. Nevertheless, the use of improved seed and mineral 
fertilizer per hectare remains relatively modest. Fertilizer use in 2008 was only 8 kilograms of nutrients per 
hectare, and area planted under improved seed amounted to less than 25 percent. At the same time, with 
increasing population pressure, traditional fallow systems are becoming obsolete and organic nutrient 
sources (for example, crop residues) are used for other purposes, such as fuel, fodder, and roofing material. 













Source: Author’s creation based on data in FAO 2010. 
Note: Index Numbers with 1980 = 100. 
   8 
During the same period, cassava production increased fourfold—from 15.9 million tons in 1980 to 
64.5 million tons in 2008—growing at an average rate of 5 percent per annum, in sharp contrast with 
cereals. And during the 1990s, when cereal production was growing at 1 percent per year, cassava 
production grew faster, at 6 percent per year, and that was despite a general decline in cassava yields. In 
the more recent period, as in the past, growth in cassava cultivated area remains a principle source of 
output growth—explaining up to 80 percent of such growth (Figure 2.3 below). Cassava yields increased 
by only 1 percent per year compared with 4 percent per year in area cultivated. Faced by economic 
hardships and high input prices, farmers may have switched from cereals to cassava. In the case of Ghana 
and Nigeria, availability of improved varieties and mechanization also contributed to this process 
(Johnson, Masters, and Peckel 2006).  












Source: Authors’ creation based on data in FAO 2010. 
Note: Index Numbers with 1980 = 100. 
When soils are unsuitable for cereal production, farmers generally switch to cassava production 
because it can be grown in low-moisture and semi-acidic soils and needs only a small quantity of 
phosphorus (IITA 1990). Cassava production in such marginal soils further degrades the soil: there are 
large exports of nutrients with the cassava tubers, and the soils become more prone to erosion. Because of 
limited use of nutrients supplied from external sources (mineral fertilizer), both cereal and cassava 
production rely heavily on nutrients supplied by the soil. Over time, nutrient depletion occurs if there is 
inadequate replenishment. As noted earlier, traditional fallow systems are becoming obsolete and organic 
sources of nutrients such as crop residues are being used for other purposes. So nutrient depletion is 
becoming a serious problem in West Africa and contributing to low crop yields. Estimates of nutrient 
depletion in the region vary, from 41 kg/ha in Senegal to 73 kg/ha in Guinea Bissau for the period 2002–
2004 (Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 below). Other estimates claim that at least half of West Africa’s farmland 
exhibits some degree of soil erosion and nutrient mining (IFAD 2001; Drechsel et al. 2001; Koning and 
Smaling 2005; ). As a result, the costs of nutrient depletion are high indeed, estimated to be about $4 
billion per year for all of Sub-Saharan Africa (IAC 2004). 
   9 















Source:  Henao and Baanante (2006). 
Table 2.3—Nutrient depletion in West Africa, 2002–2004 
Country 
Nutrient Depletion 




(kg per hectare) 
Benin  44    Liberia  66 
Burkina Faso  43    Mali  49 
Cape Verde  n.a.    Niger  56 
Cote d’Ivoire  48    Nigeria  57 
Gambia  71    Senegal  41 
Ghana  58    Sierra Leone  46 
Guinea  64    Togo  47 
Guinea-Bissau  73 
  West Africa 
(average)  55 
Source: Henao and Baanante 2006. 
To sustain production growth for both cereals and root crops, therefore, nutrient use from both 
organic and inorganic sources will need to be increased. As the supply of nutrients from organic sources is 
limited and traditional fallow systems are no longer a viable option, nutrient supply from mineral fertilizers 
will need to increase severalfold, first, to sustain the soil fertility in the long run, and second, as an 
agricultural intensification strategy to facilitate the adoption of other yield-increasing technologies to 
achieve CAADP and MDG goals. The potential to realize higher yields under current available 
technologies exists.  10 
If currently available technologies are adopted, there is sufficient evidence suggesting yields 
among all ECOWAS member countries would be well above current levels (Table 2.4 below). For many of 
these crops, known technologies are available on the shelf and may need only local adaptation. With the 
adoption of such technologies—such as improved seeds, fertilizer, water harvesting, and agronomic 
management practices—current crop yields have the potential to almost double for most crops. Although 
many research and development (R&D) efforts are ongoing in the region, more needs to be done to 
accelerate adoption and diffusion.  
Improved seeds and better agronomic practices are essential for increasing crop productivity, but 
they alone will not yield significant results in nutrient-poor soils; if anything, the use of improved seeds 
alone will convert nutrient-poor soils into marginal soils prone to soil erosion. Although farmers should be 
encouraged to use all available organic sources of nutrients, relying exclusively on organic sources will not 
supply the nutrients needed for sustaining soil fertility and facilitating the adoption of improved seeds and 
other yield-enhancing technologies. Significant growth in the use of mineral fertilizers will be needed. To 
meet the Abuja Declaration target, fertilizer use in West Africa must increase more than sixfold (36 
percent per year) during 2010–2015. Assuming that elasticity of crop production with respect to fertilizer 
use is 0.25, CAADP-targeted 6 percent annual growth in crop output will mandate 24 percent annual 
growth in fertilizer use. Achieving such growth in fertilizer use will necessitate action on both the demand 
side and the supply side of the market equation.  
Factors Affecting Fertilizer Demand 
The demand for fertilizer is a derived demand because it depends not only on the price of fertilizer itself 
but also on crop price and yield response to fertilizer, which in turn are affected by a host of underlying 
biophysical, socioeconomic, and policy/institutional factors that together ultimately determine fertilizer’s 
profitability. A simple measure commonly used to determine fertilizer profitability is the value–cost ratio, 
defined as the ratio of output to fertilizer prices multiplied by the fertilizer response rate (that is, the 
amount of additional output from a unit increase in fertilizer nutrients). According to Morris et al. (2008, 
citing Kelly 2006), value–cost ratios in Sub-Saharan Africa typically have ranged between 1.5 for cotton 
and 3.4 for groundnut (Table 2.5). Ratios of 2 or greater are generally considered as the minimum required 
for fertilizer adoption to take place (Kelly 2006).  11 
Table 2.4—Potential yields with improved technologies 









(B/A)  Source 
Cassava    Average  12.30  20.95  1.70   
Benin  High  Improved seed, with fertilizer  12.90  21.90  1.70  Carsky and Toukourou 2005 
Nigeria  High  Improved seed  13.41  19.44  1.45  Nweke, Lynam, and Spencer 2002 
Benin  High  Improved seed, with fertilizer  13.60  24.00  1.76  Zinsou et al. 2004 
Benin  Med  Improved seed, with fertilizer  10.80  18.50  1.71  Zinsou et al. 2004 
Rice    Average  2.91  4.77  1.64   
Cote D'Ivoire  Irrigated 
Imp. weeding and irrigation, 
w/fert.  3.63  4.92  1.36  Becker et al. 2001 
Senegal  Irrigated 
Imp. weeding, irrig., w/fert. & 
tractor  3.85  5.69  1.48  Becker et al. 2001 
Burkina Faso  Irrigated  Improved seed, with fertilizer  3.50  4.97  1.42  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Donovan et al. 1998) 
Ghana  Irrigated  Improved seed, with fertilizer  3.29  4.98  1.52  Somado et al. 2008 
Guinea  Med  Improved seed, with fertilizer  1.83  3.95  2.16  Somado et al. 2008 
Mali  Med  Improved seed, with fertilizer  2.08  4.27  2.05  Somado et al. 2008 
Maize    Average  1.93  3.51  1.82   
Togo  n.a.  Fertilizer  2.10  4.04  1.92  Wopereis et al. 2006 
Ghana  High  Fertilizer  2.10  4.22  2.01  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Bonsu 1996) 
Senegal  n.a.  Fertilizer  0.60  1.01  1.68  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Ndiaye and Sidibe 1992) 
Mali  Med  Improved seed, with fertilizer  1.26  3.75  2.98  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Henao et al. 1992) 
Sorghum    Average  0.90  1.80  2.00   
Mali  Low  Fertilizer  0.83  1.53  1.84  Aune et al. 2007 
Mali  Med  Improved seed, with fertilizer  0.73  2.16  2.98  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Henao et al. 1992) 
Senegal  Low  Fertilizer  1.14  1.71  1.50  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Kelly 1988) 
Millet    Average  0.46  0.81  1.76   
Mali  Low  Fertilizer  0.21  0.47  2.23  Aune et al. 2007 
Niger  n.a.  Improved seed, with fertilizer  0.92  1.23  1.35  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Bationo et al. 1994) 
Burkina Faso  Low  Improved seed, with fertilizer  0.25  0.72  2.85  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Kambou et al. 1994) 
Cotton    Average  0.68  1.12  1.65   
Mali  High  Improved seed, with fertilizer  0.82  1.31  1.59  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Henao et al. 1992) 
Senegal  High  Fertilizer  0.87  1.00  1.15  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Fall and Sow 1996) 
Mali  Med  Improved seed, with fertilizer  0.76  1.67  2.20  Yanggen et al. 1998 (c. Henao et al. 1992) 
Source: Various sources as noted.  
Note: 
a Some are local varieties, unless noted.  12 
Table 2.5—Typical value–cost ratios of fertilizer use in West Africa  
Crop  Typical  Minimum 
Maize  2.8  1.5 
Rice  2.4  1.6 
Sorghum  1.9  1.1 
Millet  2.9  0.6 
Cotton  1.5  0.6 
Groundnut  3.4  1.5 
Source: Table 4.1 in Morris et al. 2006. 
The value–cost ratio is ultimately affected by various biophysical, socioeconomic, and policy and 
institutional factors, as illustrated in Figure 2.5 below. First, Box D shows how the use of fertilizer is 
derived by on-farm profitability (yield response, output prices, and production costs), which in turn is 
affected by a number of broad environmental conditions: biophysical (Box A), socioeconomic (Box C), 
and the policy and institutional environment (Box B). 
Biophysical Constraints 
One important obstacle to promoting fertilizer demand, and improved technologies in general, in West 
Africa is the diversity of biophysical conditions (Box A, Figure 2.5) within and across countries, which in 
turn results in a wide range of distinctive farming systems, production constraints, and yield performance. 
For example, as one moves from the south to the north in much of the region, the amount of annual 
rainfall decreases while its variability and uncertainty increase, thereby contributing to higher production 
uncertainties and risks associated with using purchased inputs such as fertilizer. Plants need an adequate 
supply of moisture for nutrient uptake and crop growth. Technology uptake in the more semiarid areas, 
therefore, is likely to be more successful if it goes hand in hand with water harvesting and irrigation 
development (Shapiro and Sanders 1998). On the other hand, in the more humid and semihumid ecologies 
in the south—which have an adequate supply of moisture from rainfall and are thus often suitable for tree 
crops (such as cocoa, coffee, oil palm, and rubber) and mixed cropping systems (root and cereal crops)—
protection against pests and insects is critical. 
In all the agroecosystems, as fallow systems have shrunk in duration due to population pressures, 
the limited application of nutrients poses a serious constraint to crop productivity growth while 
threatening the sustainability of the natural resource base. As demonstrated in a study IFPRI undertook 
for the West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development 
(CORAF/WECARD), overcoming many of the key biophysical constraints facing the region can 
dramatically increase yields (Johnson et al. 2008).  13 
Figure 2.5—Conceptualizing the farmer’s derived demand for fertilizer 
 
Source: Adapted from Figure 1 of Crawford et al. 2003. 
Socioeconomic Constraints 
The biophysical conditions for agriculture in West Africa are only a strong indicator of the sector’s 
absolute potential. It does not tell us the extent to which that potential can be realized by its economic 
comparative advantage (Johnson et al. 2008). Socioeconomic factors (both price and nonprice factors) 
affect the degree to which agriculture can become a viable commercial activity for generating income and 
employment (Box C, Figure 2.5). Expensive inputs are typically a primary constraint to intensive 
agriculture and fertilizer adoption. For example, a study by Abdoulaye and Sanders (2005) in Niger 
shows the fertilizer-to-millet price ratio as a key determinant of fertilizer adoption. However, nonprice 
factors can matter a great deal, too. In fact, a low response to fertilizer prices in some cases simply 
reflects a lack of access to fertilizer or to credit and cash (Larson and Frisvold 1996; Abrar, Morrissey, 
and Rayner 2004). In such cases, therefore, the binding constraint is simply access.  
- Population density, 
access and size of markets 
(urban and rural, export 
markets, remoteness) 
- Transportation and 
transaction costs 
- Degree of market 
integration and/or links 
(such as cross-border) 






Net returns  
X 
A: Biophysical Environment  B: Policy & Institutional Environment 
- Technology policy and 
R&D capacity  
- Macroeconomic and 
marketing policies (import 




- Infrastructure (roads, 
ports, warehouses) 
- Agroecology and climate 
zones (agricultural potential, 
rainfall patterns) 
- Agronomic (soil types, 
topography, and fertility) 
- Access to water (waterways, 










































Output market prices, 
input supply costs 






D: Profitability  C: Economic Environment 14 
In seeking to explain the socioeconomic dynamics of transforming from a subsistence-oriented 
production system (one that relies heavily on traditional labor and land inputs) to a more intensified 
system (one that relies on improved technologies and purchased complementary inputs such as inorganic 
fertilizers), Hayami and Ruttan (1985) offer a useful theoretical framework referred to as the induced 
innovation theory. According to the theory, as land becomes scarce with population growth, farmers 
reduce soil-conserving land use practices such as fallow. Farmers may also adopt improved technologies, 
such as high-yield seed varieties, inorganic fertilizer, and irrigation methods. However, for this to occur, 
other factors also become relevant, including the cost and availability of capital, credit, fertilizer, and 
extension services (Feder, Just, and Zilberman 1985). These in turn are affected by the degree of access to 
markets, rural services, and basic infrastructure for selling their surplus, accessing information, and 
purchasing inputs (Binswanger and Pingali 1988).  
As Figure 2.6 shows below, the most densely populated areas are found primarily in the coastal 
areas, particularly in Nigeria and clustered around major urban centers. Population densities are far lower 
in much of the Sahel except around major urban centers and along the Niger River. Building on Hayami 
and Ruttan’s hypothesis, a general observation is that areas with higher population densities and higher 
agricultural potential are more likely to often have a higher concentration of agricultural commercial 
activities. These are areas in proximity to major population centers with stronger production-to-market 
linkages, and farmers here are therefore more likely to purchase inputs and use improved technologies. 























Source: Johnson et al. 2008. 
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For market access, measured as travel time, there is significant variation but a strong correlation 
with population density (Figure 2.7).
5 Not surprisingly, access to markets tends to be strong in densely 
populated areas—along major trade corridors and rivers, or near large urban centers where a significant 
scale of economic activity takes place. 






















Source: Johnson et al. 2008. 
All in all, removing constraints to expanded trade and access to input supplies will be 
fundamental for accelerating growth in food production, and ultimately, economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Already, the region as a whole has become a net importer of food over time (especially rice and 
livestock products). The growing demand for these products means there is a ready market for an increase 
in supply provided constraints separating and fragmenting country markets are removed to create a 
unified West Africa regional market for inputs and outputs. Some of the key constraints are low adoption 
of technology, underdeveloped rural infrastructure and financial markets, restricted trade policies, 
nonintegration of regional markets, and limited access to markets by smallholder farmers.  
There is potential to reverse these trends. For example, as long as food imports expand rapidly with 
population growth and urbanization, domestic food production systems have the potential to tap into those 
growing markets (Diao and Hazell 2004). Fortunately, signs suggest the region is already moving in that 
direction. Intraregional trade in agricultural commodities is approaching 12 percent of total exports, and 
ECOWAS and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) have vigorously promoted 
greater regional economic integration among their member states.  
                                                      
5 Based on Johnson et al. (2008). Travel times to targeted market locations were estimated using a model that jointly 
assesses information on road location and quality, slope, and off-road land cover. High market access was defined as a condition 
wherein rural inhabitants were found to be within four hours of travel from major seaports or large cities of 500,000 or more 
inhabitants (for international trade routes), within two hours of towns of 100,000 or more, or within one hour of towns of 10,000. 
Areas of medium access were defined as those within six hours of large cities, within four hours of large towns, or within two 
hours of smaller towns. All other locations were considered as low access. 16 
Policy and Institutional Constraints 
Finally, policies and institutions (Box B, Figure 2.5) are instrumental in helping to provide an enabling 
environment for increased productivity and market development, and in particular, incentives to use 
fertilizer and other improved technologies. For example, increased investments in agricultural R&D to 
offer higher-yielding seed varieties together with interventions to promote greater access to markets, 
extension, and finance can result in greater use of fertilizers. 
An uncertain or inconsistent policy environment can give wrong signals to both farmers and 
traders in the market and thereby add to transaction costs. The presence of weak institutions also increases 
transaction costs due to coordination failures (Dorward et al. 2004). In cash crop production systems, for 
example, the use of interlocking contracts between farmers (or farmer groups) and buying firms has 
played an especially important role in improving market coordination mechanisms. The contracts provide 
farmers with access to credit, fertilizer, and seeds under the guarantee that they sell the output produced to 
the firm. Some good cropping examples are cocoa in Ghana, cotton in Mai, and groundnut in  Senegal.  
For the majority of smallholders producing staple foodcrops such interlocking arrangements are 
nonexistent, and thus they face higher transaction costs in accessing fertilizer. Where improvements have 
been made in linking with better-integrated supply chains (such as through farmer organizations, producer 
associations, or cooperatives), they have been shown to increase farmer access to input and output 
markets (Haggblade and Hazell 2010).  
Importance of Supply-Side Factors  
As shown in the previous section, one factor undermining the derived demand for fertilizer and other 
improved technologies in West Africa is their limited affordability and farmers’ poor access to markets 
and services. As we show in the next section, even where market access has been high, the use of 
purchased inputs such as fertilizer can be easily undermined by supply-side distortions that contribute to 
high fertilizer prices. As the primary focus of this paper, we will examine such distortions in more detail 
and suggest ways in which the supply of fertilizer may be improved through greater regional market 
development and integration, including the creation of a common fertilizer market for West Africa.  17 
3.  TRENDS IN FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION, AND TRADE 
As noted in the previous section, the derived demand for fertilizer is interlinked with both biophysical and 
socioeconomic factors as well as policy environments. Many of these factors along with high prices have 
induced lower fertilizer demand in West Africa and affected market performance. In this section, we trace 
the trends of fertilizer consumption, production, and trade in order to gain an understanding of the size 
and growth potential of current fertilizer markets in the region. 
Fertilizer Consumption 
To begin with, fertilizer consumption in West Africa has changed little over the past two decades (Figure 
3.1). During the 1990s, it actually decreased—from 525,000 nutrient tons in 1990 to 445,000 in 2000. 
Although consumption had rebounded by 2005 (reaching 516,000 nutrient tons), it eventually dropped 
again to a mere 309,000 tons by 2007. The dramatic reduction was a result of rising prices that culminated 
in record levels during the global food and fertilizer crisis of 2008. That crisis forced governments to 
quickly introduce support and subsidy measures to avert a food security crisis that could possibly lead to 
food riots and political instability. As a result fertilizer use actually increased to 678,000 tons in 2008—a 
119 percent increase from the 2007 level and a 31 percent increase from the 2005 level.
6 

















Source: Derived from FAO 2010.  
Notes: NPK is Nitrogen, Phosphates and Potash. Tons are metric tons. 
Altogether, West Africa accounts for a very small share of the global fertilizer market—a mere 
0.4 percent in 2008. During the same year, it made up 14 percent of the African market but almost half of 
the Sub-Saharan African market (46 percent). Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole accounted for only 1 
percent of the global fertilizer market (Figure 3.2). The countries of East and South Asia are responsible 
for almost 50 percent of global consumption—more than 80 million tons per year (dominated by China 
and India). The Americas and Europe consume another 30 percent. 
 
                                                      























Figure 3.2—Global fertilizer consumption by major region, 2002–2008  
 
Source: Derived from FAO 2010. 
Notes; Tons are metric tons. 
At the country level, the size of the market becomes even smaller in the global context. Nigeria 
accounts for the bulk of fertilizer consumption in the region (more than half, 54 percent based on three 
year average between 2006 and 2008), but that is far below the levels seen in Brazil, Indonesia, or South 
Africa, not to mention India, China, or the United States. Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Ghana together account 
for another 34 percent (Figure 3.3). In 2008, Nigeria consumed 498,000 tons and Cote d’Ivoire 53,000 
tons. The rest used less than 50,000 tons each—several of them less than 10,000 tons. Liberia and Sierra 
Leone may have used less than 1,000 tons each.
7  
Such small consumption levels translate into very low fertilizer use intensities in the region—in 
terms of the amount applied per hectare of cultivated land. The average in the West Africa region is about 
8 kg/ha (which is similar to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa). This is much lower than the global average of 
107 kg/ha, and even more so when compared with South Asia and South America (Figure 3.4). Such low 
levels of fertilizer use are insufficient to replenish the nutrients removed by harvested crops, much less to 
promote the adoption of improved seeds. 
   
                                                      
7 No reliable data are available for these countries. An IFDC assessment of input markets in these countries reported small 
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Figure 3.3—Fertilizer consumption in West Africa, 2002–2008  
 
Source: Derived from FAO 2010.  
Notes: Tons are metric tons. NPK is Nitrogen, Phosphate and Potash. 
Figure 3.4—Fertilizer use (kg/ha) in major regions of the world, 2008–2009 
. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in FAO 2010. 
Complementary to the low intensity of fertilizer use in the region is the low rate of adoption of 
improved seeds and use of irrigation. Evenson and Gollin (2003) estimated adoption rates of improved 
seed on 24 percent of the cultivated area on average and way below the averages in South Asia, for 
example (about 45 percent). Irrigation use is limited to a mere 4 percent of cultivated area relative to 
almost 40 percent in South Asia (World Bank 2007). These observations stress the important link 
between fertilizer use and broader incentives associated with agricultural intensification discussed in 






























































Because the fertilizer industry is capital intensive and exhibits economies of scale in production 
and procurement, the small domestic fertilizer markets cannot take advantage of economies of scale other 
regions in the world enjoy. Indeed, there is potential to strive toward taking advantage of any economies 
of scale to be had from creating a common regional fertilizer market in West Africa. This becomes even 
more imperative if the region wishes to expand its own capacities to produce and procure fertilizer. 
Fertilizer Production 
West Africa is endowed with natural gas and phosphate rock reserves (IFDC 2006). Mali, Senegal, Togo, 
Niger, and Burkina Faso have phosphate rock deposits, whereas Ghana, Nigeria, and Guinea have natural 
gas deposits (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). However, only two countries, namely Nigeria and Senegal, have 
developed these resources for fertilizer production, and only one, Togo, has developed its phosphate rock 
resources for export. Mali is developing Tilemsi phosphate rock for direct application as well as for 
fertilizer production, and Ghana is exploring the possibility of building ammonia urea plants based on its 
newly found natural gas reserves. 




























Source: IFDC 2006.  21 


























Source: IFDC 2006. 
During the early 1990s, West Africa produced 394,000 tons of fertilizer nutrients per annum 
(Figure 3.7 below). Fertilizer plants in Nigeria (the Nitrogen Fertilizer Company of Nigeria, or 
NAFCON) and Senegal (Industries Chimique du Senegal, or ICS) contributed most to this production. 
However, a gradual decrease in capacity use (caused by financial and technical constraints) at both 
NAFCON and ICS plants induced a declining trend in fertilizer production. In 2000, only 52,000 tons 
were produced in the whole of West Africa, and by 2008, still less than 100,000 tons of nutrients were 
produced. If in 2011 both NAFCON and ICS plants run at full capacity, they can again potentially 
produce more than 300,000 tons of nutrients. 
   22 
Figure 3.7—West Africa: Fertilizer Production, 1990/91-2008/09 
. 
Source: Based on data in FAO 2010. 
Although West Africa is endowed with natural gas and phosphate rock, it has not been able to 
convert these resources into production facilities due to the small size of the market, huge capital 
requirements, high energy and transportation costs, underdeveloped infrastructure, and management and 
operational inefficiencies. Nevertheless West Africa has invested in blending plants for producing 
blended NPK (nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium) products based on imported straight fertilizers such 
as urea, diammonium phosphate (DAP), triple superphosphate (TSP), single superphosphate (SSP), and 
muriate of potash (MOP). Blending plants are available in Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and other countries. 
However, because of limited growth in fertilizer consumption, even the blending capacity is not fully 
utilized. Approximately a third of the blending capacity was under utilized in Nigeria in 2009. 
Fertilizer Trade 
With limited production in the region, fertilizer trade plays an indispensable role in satisfying fertilizer 
requirements. Urea, DAP, MOP, TSP, and NPK (both granulated and blended) are imported in the region. 
Several specialized NPK products are imported or blended for cotton, cocoa, coffee, and horticultural 
crops. A plurality of NPK products have fragmented the market and added to costs of import and 
distribution. Trends in fertilizer imports, therefore, closely reflect the trends in fertilizer consumption. 
Very little fertilizer is re-exported from the region. 
Overall, the trend in the value of imports over time has crept upward (Figure 3.8). All countries 
saw an increase in the value of fertilizer imports starting in 2002, when global fertilizer prices began to 
rise, and peaking in 2008. In 2002, imports of total NPK fertilizers were valued at about $150 million. By 
2008, that had reached almost $600 million—a period when the world price of urea increased fourfold. 
Nigeria, for example, imported more than $250 million worth of fertilizers in 2008 compared with $50 
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Figure 3.8—Value of NPK (total Nitrogen, Phosphate and Potash) imports in West Africa  
(1990–2008) 
 
Source: Author’s creation based on data from FAO 2010.  
The share of fertilizer imports to the value of agricultural production can help paint a broad 
picture of the intensity of fertilizer use across countries in the region. Figure 3.9 shows Mali, Senegal, and 
Cote d’Ivoire consistently maintaining the highest shares, at 1% to 2%, between 1990 and 2008. In other 
words, on average these countries spend a higher proportion of their earnings from agricultural production 
on fertilizer imports.
8    
                                                      
8 Benin used 29,600 tons of nutrients during 2008/09 as per IFDC’s MIR Plus project database. However, it was not reported 


































































































































Figure 3.9—Share of fertilizer imports to agricultural GDP, value of total imports of N+P+K  
 
Source: Calculated from FAO 2010 and World Bank 2010. 
Note: N = Nitrogen, P = Phosphates, and K = Potassium 
Traditionally, export crops, such as cotton, cocoa, and groundnut, have dominated fertilizer use in 
West Africa. Over time, however, cereals (maize, sorghum/millet, and rice, in particular) have come to 
dominate. The expansion in horticulture crops has also contributed to increasing imports of specialty 
fertilizer products (as in cotton). Across Sub-Saharan Africa, maize accounts for 26 percent of fertilizer 
use (Table 3.1). In total, 64 percent of the region’s fertilizer use is devoted to staple foodcrops. 
Table 3.1—Fertilizer use by crop in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2002 
  Fertilizer Use (’000 tons, 
N + P2O5 + K2O) 
Percent Share 
of Total (%) 
Food staples 
Maize  160.5  26.0 
Sorghum/millet  107.8  17.4 
Rice  49.7  8.0 
Cassava/taro/yam  32.3  5.2 
Pulses  25.5  4.1 
Potato  18.9  3.1 
Subtotal  394.7  63.9 












































  Fertilizer Use  
(’000 tons, N + P2O5 + K2O) 
Percent Share 
of Total (%) 
High value (inc. export crops) 
Wheat and barley
a  67.1  10.9 
Cotton  35.1  5.7 
Vegetables  26.4  4.3 
Tobacco
a  19.8  3.2 
Coffee  17.8  2.9 
Fruit crops  17.1  2.8 
Groundnut  11  1.8 
Tea
a  9  1.5 
Sugar cane
a  7  1.1 
Oil palm  2.8  0.5 
Soybean  2.5  0.4 
Others  7.6  1.2 
Subtotal  223.2  36.1 
     
Total  617.9  100.0 
Source: Adapted from Table 7 in FAO 2006, which cites an earlier FAO (2002) study. 
Note: 
a These high-value crops are mostly grown in southern and/or eastern Africa. 
One of the critical challenges facing the region is the high degree of economic inefficiencies 
brought about by individual countries importing their own fertilizer blend specifications and specialty 
products. A well-known example is the cotton formula: Although cotton-producing areas of different 
countries are often contiguous and biophysically similar, due to country-based regulations, they use 
different cotton formulas (NPK products), with artificial product differentiation (Table 3.2). Harmonizing 
the cotton formula to the extent appropriate could potentially generate substantial savings in procurement 
and distribution (see Table 6.2 for details). 
Table 3.2—Dominant cotton formulas used in West Africa 
Country  Company 
Formula 
N-P2O5-K2O-S-B 
     
Mali  CMDT  14-22-12-7-1 
Benin  SONAPRA  14-23-14-5-1 
Burkina Faso  SOFITEX  14-23-14-6-1 
Togo  SOTOCO  12-20-18-5-1 
Cameroon  SODECOTON  15-20-15-6-1  
Cote d’Ivoire  CIDT  15-15-15-6-1 
Source: Gregory and Bumb 2006. 26 
4.  FERTILIZER POLICIES AND SUPPLY CHAINS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES  
In Section 3 we discussed trends in fertilizer consumption, production, and trade in West Africa and 
concluded that the market at the country level is too small to realize economies of scale in production and 
procurement and that fertilizer use levels are low, even to sustain soil fertility, much less to encourage the 
adoption of yield-enhancing technologies. We also suggested that policymakers and development partners 
should continue to strive to create a common fertilizer market in West Africa to promote increased and 
efficient use of fertilizers by reducing transaction costs and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
markets.  
To set the stage for the creation of a wider regional market, and with the aim of identifying 
constraints and distortions affecting the functioning of the fertilizer markets  and suggesting suitable 
measures for their removal, in this section we assess existing fertilizer policies and supply chains at the 
country level in selected countries. 
As mentioned in Section 1, we selected four countries—namely, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and 
Senegal—for an in-depth analysis of issues affecting fertilizer demand and supply at the country level. 
The policy environment and the supply chain in each country are summarized in this section.
9 Table 4.1 
below provides details on market size, key actors, and main constraints in each country.  
Fertilizer Policy and Supply Chain in Ghana 
Size of the Market 
The fertilizer market in Ghana is the fourth largest in West Africa—after Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Mali. In 2009, Ghana imported and used 218,000 tons of fertilizer products; yet its fertilizer use intensity 
was very low at 4 kg/ha of nutrients in 2008, in contrast to 58 kg/ha of nutrients being removed by 
harvested crops. The main products imported and used were urea, ammonium sulfate (AS), DAP, NPK 
15-15-15, and other NPK products and blends. More than 50 percent of fertilizer products are used on 
cash crops like cocoa, cotton, sugarcane, oil palm, pineapple, and horticultural products, and the 
remainder is used on foodcrops such as maize, rice, sorghum, millet, and beans.  
In spite of a fourfold increase in global fertilizer prices during the food and fertilizer crisis of 
2007–2008, fertilizer use decreased marginally in 2008 and registered more than a 50 percent increase in 
2009, mostly attributable to a subsidy on various fertilizer products in the range of 32 to 52 percent 
(averaging 45 percent) of the price paid by farmers (Table 4.2). The Government of Ghana financed 
107,000 tons of products under the subsidy program. 
 
                                                      
9 See Fuentes, Bumb, and Johnson (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d) for details on each of the individual country case study 
reports. 27 
Table 4.1—Key actors and constraints in the fertilizer markets in West Africa 




Golden Stork, and Dizengoff 
Yara/Hydrochem, Toguna Agro 
Industries, and La Cigogne/SCPA-
SSI  
La Cigogne, Bolton, TSE, and 
AGROPHYTEX 
Golden Fertilizers, Notore, and Tak 




Tema and Takoradi  Dakar (Senegal) and Abidjan (Cote 
d’Ivoire) 
Dakar  Lagos 
Wholesalers  15–20  10–15  5–7  20–30 
Retailers/stockists  2,700  300 co-ops/producer orgs. (POs)   Small number  4,000 
Market size (2008/09)  218,000 product tons  150,00 product tons  73,000 product tons  600,000–800,000 product tons 
Fertilizer use intensity 
(kg/ha) 
 4  7  7  12 
Market structure  Oligopolistic at import level, 
and competitive at wholesale 
and retail levels 
Oligopolistic at import level; 
tendering by apex POs and 
distribution by co-ops in 
cotton/maize and rice sectors; a few 




based distribution; 85% 
government/SOE controlled for 
cereals and cotton 
smallholders; 15% private 
sector based for commercial 
crops 
Tender-controlled, subsidy 
oriented—80% of the market;  
20% private sector/large-scale 
farms. Policy-constrained at all 
levels—import, wholesale, and 
retail levels; state-controlled 
organizations like ADPs do 
distribution at the retail levels  
Urea price (US$/ton)  
•  Import price (CIF) 
•  Retail price 


















Key constraints  • Poor implementation of 
subsidy policy  
• Limited access to finance; 
interest rates 30%–35% 
• Ineffective enforcement of 
quality regulation 
• Inefficient port operations  
• Limited human capital 
• Outdated fertilizer 
recommendations 
• Long, overdrawn tendering system 
• Limited access to finance; interest 
rates 8%–15% 
• No labs for product testing and 
quality enforcement 
• In-transit transport cost and taxes 
• Underdeveloped retail networks 
• Outdated fertilizer 
recommendations 
• Subsidized government- 
controlled market 
• Limited access to finance; 
interest rates 12%–20% 
• No quality control system 
• Underdeveloped retail 
networks 
• Uncertain and inconsistent policy 
environment 
• Different subsidy regimes at 
federal, state, and local 
government levels 
• Ineffective regulatory system 
• Inefficiencies at the port 
• Underdeveloped agrodealer 
system 
Source: Authors, from in-country surveys.  
Notes: CIF = cost, insurance, and freight; ADPs = agricultural development projects;  
a Includes $79.40 for in-land transportation from the port of entry in Dakar or Abidjan to Bamako.  
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Table 4.2—Fertilizer subsidy (coupon value) by product and regions in Ghana, 2009 
Product /  Urea  SA  NPK 15-15-15  NPK 23-10-5 
Region  Coupon 
Value 
a 












% of Total 
Price 
Northern  $9.2  33%  $10.6  45%  $20.6  53%  $19.2  53% 
Upper East  $9.9  35%  $11.4  47%  $21.4  53%  $19.9  54% 
Upper West  $9.4  34%  $10.8  46%  $20.8  53%  $19.4  53% 
Central  $8.3  31%  $9.8  43%  $19.8  52%  $18.3  52% 
Eastern  $8.9  32%  $10.3  44%  $20.3  52%  $18.9  52% 
Brong Ahafo  $8.9  32%  $10.3  44%  $20.3  52%  $18.9  52% 
Western  $8.6  32%  $10.1  44%  $20.1  52%  $18.6  52% 
Greater Accra  $7.9  30%  $9.4  42%  $19.4  51%  $17.9  51% 
Volta  $8.9  32%  $10.4  45%  $20.4  52%  $18.9  52% 
Ashanti  $8.4  31%  $9.9  43%  $19.9  52%  $18.4  52% 
Averages  $8.8  32%  $10.3  44%  $20.3  52%  $18.8  52% 
Source: Fuentes et al. 2010a. 
Note:
 a The exchange rate considered for estimating the coupon value and the product price is 1.4 GHC to US$1.00.  
Ghana phased out all subsidies on fertilizers in 1988, and there were no subsidies until 2008 when 
global fertilizer prices skyrocketed and threatened the gains in food production. To keep food production 
from falling, the government introduced fertilizer subsidies in July 2008, although that was a little late for 
the southern districts where the cropping season started in May (see Banful 2009). Nevertheless, fertilizer 
subsidies seem to have played an important role not only in arresting the possible decline in fertilizer use 
but also in increasing fertilizer use significantly at 218,000 product tons in 2009, in contrast to 137,000 
tonsin 2006. The cost of the subsidy program in 2009 was GHC 44.0 million ($31.4 million).
10 However, 
the modus operandi of subsidy implementation introduced certain distortions in the market and adversely 
affected agrodealers’ operations at the retail levels.  
Key Players in the Supply Chain 
Four key importers dominate the fertilizer supply chain: Yara/Wienco, Chemico, Golden Stork, and 
Dizengoff. They accounted for 95 percent of fertilizers imported in 2009. Among them, Yara/Wienco 
seems to have the longest and most dominant presence in the country in terms of market share. Yara and 
other importers (except Chemico) took part in negotiations with the Ghanaian government for pricing of 
subsidized fertilizers.  These importers have good subsidiary linkages with international suppliers and can 
access capital and foreign exchange from international sources at interest rates of 8 to 10 percent. These 
importers are supported by 20 to 25 wholesalers (the distinction between importer and wholesaler is 
blurred as importers also act as wholesalers) and 2,700 retailers and stockists, spread across 107 districts. 
However, most retailers are concentrated in towns or near peri-urban areas, thereby making it difficult for 
smallholder farmers in remote areas to access fertilizers. 
As Figure 4.1 below shows, three supply chains operate in Ghana. In the first, fertilizers are 
imported by key importers and sold to farmers via independent wholesalers and retailers. Although there 
is no vertical integration in this chain, different actors are generally well connected through normal 
                                                      
10 Exchange rate: US$1.00 = GHC 1.4.  
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marketing processes. In a few cases, importers provide 30-day consignment credit to wholesalers, and 
wholesalers to retailers, but most wholesalers and retailers use their own resources to purchase and sell 
fertilizer. Institutional financing for business development and operations is not easily available in Ghana 
(see below). This supply chain dominates the country’s fertilizer market. In the second chain, the 
parastatal COCOBOD depends on importers (Chemico and Yara/Wienco) to supply its fertilizer, but then 
it uses its own dealer network to distribute fertilizer to cocoa growers at a highly subsidized price (more 
than 60 percent subsidy). In this chain, COCOBOD bypasses the retailers. However, if cocoa growers 
need additional fertilizer, they rely on local retailers whose number is limited in cocoa-growing areas 
because COCOBOD dealers benefit from implicit subsidies in terms of capital, storage, and transportation 
facilities. The third supply chain consists of plantation estates—oil palm, pineapple, and other cash crops. 
These growers negotiate directly with importers over the price and quantity of fertilizers needed, and they 
get product delivered to their warehouses. From there, they distribute it to their smallholder growers. In 
this chain, also, retailers are bypassed. These two supply chains generally discourage the healthy 
development of retail networks in the rural areas.  
In addition to these actors, supply chains also include port authorities, banking and financial 
institutions, transportation companies, and government authorities (providing regulation and extension 
advice and collecting tariffs and taxes). We discuss the impact of market structure on market performance 
(costs and margins) in Section 5. 
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Source: Fuentes et al. 2010a.  
Note: HV= High Value.
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Main Constraints and Distortions 
Nonconducive Policy Environment 
Since 1992, the Government of Ghana (GOG) has not intervened in fertilizer market operations; 
importation and marketing of fertilizers have been done by private-sector organizations. However, in 
2008, the government introduced fertilizer subsidies to protect smallholder farmers from the negative 
impact of high fertilizer prices. The program was implemented in a market-friendly manner through 
coupons to targeted farmers. However, to minimize the cost of the program to the treasury, the 
government invited tenders and negotiated the retail price at the district level. By inviting tenders, it 
introduced uncertainty in the market, and by not taking into account the concerns of the retailers in fixing 
the price, it adversely affected many retailers by allowing low margins. Moreover, as coupons were 
redeemed through importers, more than 60 percent of retailers not associated with importers could not 
easily participate in the program (Karusova and Banful 2010). At the import level, delays in redeeming 
vouchers created cash flow problems for importers. At the farmer level, getting the coupons signed by the 
director of agriculture at the district level introduced rent-seeking opportunities and irregularities. As the 
subsidy program accounted for nearly 50 percent of the market, importers were hesitant to import 
products outside of the subsidy program. Thus the implementation of the subsidy program created 
distortions and restricted the development of retail networks in rural areas. 
Limited Access to Finance 
At all levels of the supply chain, access to financing is highly constrained for two reasons. First, interest 
rates of 30 to 35 percent are prohibitively high. The treasury bill rate of 27 to 29 percent discourages 
banks to invest in agriculture—a more risky venture. Second, collateral requirements of 100 to 150 
percent make it difficult for local importers and agrodealers to borrow funds for business development 
and operations. Thus, the limited access to financing has acted as a pseudo-barrier to business 
development and scale of operations. This forces agrodealers to use their own funds and operate at a small 
scale, thereby incurring higher transaction costs.  
Regulatory Frameworks 
Although Ghana has enacted the new fertilizer law, it has not strengthened the capacity to enforce quality 
control regulations at the point of sale. Farmers question the quality of blended products, and that coupled 
with old fertilizer recommendations seems to be creating a crisis of confidence among smallholders 
because they do not see the benefits of using fertilizer. For a competitive marketing system, effective 
enforcement of quality regulations is essential. Otherwise poor-quality products and their sellers can 
crowd out honest agrodealers selling quality products. 
Fertilizer Recommendations 
Limited financial resources and capacity with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) has resulted in 
inadequate extension and technology transfer to farmers. It has also prevented the Ghanaian government 
from conducting soil testing and fertilizer trials to develop new fertilizer recommendations. As a result, 
fertilizer recommendations are based on work done during the 1970s. Clearly, new research is needed, 
and farmers should be educated with new fertilizer recommendations. 
Port Operations 
At the port of Tema, where most import cargo is handled, the port authority’s monopoly in providing 
labor for the unloading and bagging of fertilizers adds unnecessary additional cost for demurrage and 
stevedoring. The limited berth space and shallow depth also contribute to delays in handling cargoes. 
Various levies and taxes further compound the delays in moving fertilizers. 
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Transportation Bottlenecks 
Although the Tema port provides good storage and blending facilities and transportation links to move 
fertilizers to districts in the central and northern part of the country, poor road conditions, old 
transportation equipment, and limited competition in the trucking industry add to transportation costs—
averaging $0.14/ton kilometer ($0.21/ton mile). And the lack of all-weather roads helps isolate rural areas 
and prevents smallholder farmers in those areas from accessing inputs at cost-effective prices.  
Fertilizer Policy and Supply Chain in Mali 
Size of the Market 
Historically, the Malian fertilizer market has been dominated by two crops: cotton and rice, managed by 
CMDT (Compagnie Malienne pour le Developpment des Texttile) and the Office du Niger (ON), 
respectively. These two crops accounted for more than 90 percent of fertilizer use, with cotton alone 
accounting for more than 70 percent during the 1990s. At its peak, Mali used more than 158,000 product 
tons of fertilizer in 1998; thereafter, use decreased slowly, reaching 125,000 tons in 2003. A crisis in the 
cotton sector resulting from low cotton prices in the global market and efforts that began in 2000 to 
privatize CMDT have led to the disintegration of input supply systems and caused a gradual decline in 
fertilizer use. During 2003 to 2007, the fertilizer market stagnated around 150,000 product tons. An 
increase in global fertilizer prices (Mali being an import-dependent country) affected fertilizer use 
adversely in 2008, and use remained at 93,000 tons. Such a steep decrease in fertilizer use forced the 
Government of Mali to introduce fertilizer subsidies. Fertilizer use intensity is still low at 7 kg/ha. 
Cotton, rice, and maize are the dominant fertilized crops in Mali. Urea, DAP, NPK 15-15-15, and 
cotton formula 14-22-12-7S-1B are the main fertilizer products used in the country. Although Mali is 
endowed with good quality Tilemsi phosphate rock, several factors, including high transportation costs, 
the dusty nature of the product, and security risks in the mining area, have limited its use. The 
government gave a concession (mining and processing rights) to Toguna Agro-Industries in 2007 to 
promote its use through granulation and processed phosphates. 
Like many other West African countries, Mali phased out fertilizer subsidies during the early 
1990s and allowed the private sector to import fertilizers after 2000. However, as the privatization of 
CMDT took a long time, the private sector’s role remained and still remains limited as most of the 
fertilizers are procured and distributed by producer organizations (POs) and cooperative societies 
operating under commodity zones created during the 1970s, namely CMDT and ON, known then as rural 
development authorities.  
The Malian government implemented subsidies through vouchers (coupons) during 2008 but due 
to many problems including fraud and misuse of vouchers by rent-seeking groups, it decided to fix the 
uniform subsidized retail price at FCFA 12,500 ($27.11
11) per 50 kg bag of urea, DAP, and NPK. 
Difference between subsidized price and market price was paid to the dealer. Based on 2009 prices, the 
average subsidy accounted for 29 percent of the price.  
Key Players in the Supply Chain 
In the past, SOEs, such as CMDT, had a monopoly in fertilizer import and distribution in an interlocked 
contracting system of input distribution and output procurement at a predetermined price. Inputs were 
supplied on credit and payments were deducted from the value of the crop delivered to CMDT. This 
system ceased to exist as efforts to privatize CMDT began in 2000.
12 Currently, three different systems 
(Figure 4.2 below) operate in CMDT’s cotton/maize zone, ON’s rice zone, and other areas monitored by 
DNA (Directeur National d’ Agriculture).  
 
                                                      
11 Exchange rate: CFA 461 = US$1.00. 
12 The privatization of CMDT has yet to occur.  
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Source: Fuentes et al. 2010b. 
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In the CMDT zone, POs are responsible for estimating and pooling demand from farmers based 
on the caution technique
13 issued by DNA and submitting the estimates to a higher-level council called 
GIE (Groupement d’Interet Economique [Economic Interest Council]), which is responsible for inviting 
tenders, arranging financing, and procuring fertilizers. There are three major importers: Toguna Agro-
Industries, Yara/Hydrochem, and Le Cigogne, although Le Cigogne focuses mostly on crop protection 
products. Tenders are reviewed and approved by GIE. Importers, mainly Toguna and Yara, have to 
deposit funds with BNDA (Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Agricole) with tender bids. Based 
on the approved tenders, importers supply fertilizers to warehouses in the CMDT zones. From there, 
CMDT distributes fertilizers to POs, which distribute to cooperative societies, which in turn supply 
farmers based on their adjusted request under the caution technique. CMDT provides technical support to 
GIE and is expected to test the quality of supplied products before they are distributed to farmers. 
Fertilizers are supplied to farmers on credit issued by BNDA through local banks, guaranteed by the 
Government of Mali. GIE, through CMDT, is responsible for loan recovery from farmers. CMDT 
procures cotton and deducts the cost of inputs from the value of the cotton supplied by farmers. The 
farmers who do not repay loans are disqualified from participation in the system in the next season.  
In the ON zone, a similar process is followed where CCAE (Commission Centrale pour 
l’Acquisition d’Engrais) is responsible for pooling fertilizer requirements and tendering fertilizers and 
arranging finance. However, once the tenders are awarded, importers supply fertilizers directly to POs, 
which are responsible for loan recovery. Unlike CMDT, ON is not involved in the distribution of inputs 
or procurement of rice; it is primarily responsible for rice production in irrigated areas but does tendering 
of inputs. In areas other than the CMDT and ON zones, DNA through its regional offices (DRAs) 
estimates demand from farmers through the caution technique and invites tenders for supplying fertilizers. 
Importers, mostly Toguna and Yara, deliver products to regional warehouses monitored by DRAs that in 
turn distribute fertilizers to farmers.  
Based on the awarded tender, an importer or wholesaler can get a letter of credit from BNDA (or 
another commercial bank) with a guarantee from the Malian government. The interest rate for farmers is 
12 percent. Once the product is supplied to regional warehouses, suppliers can submit their invoice to the 
bank for payment for the nonsubsidy component. For the subsidy component, they must submit the claim 
directly to the government. The process of tendering and payment to importers is long and adds to 
transaction costs and price.  
Because the cooperative societies dominate the distribution of fertilizers, opportunities for a retail 
market are limited. Still rudimentary retail networks have developed to serve farmers outside the 
commodity zones or those who are not members of POs. The total number of such retailers/stockists is 
limited, but many belong to an association, ORIAM (Operateurs d’Intrants Agricoles du Mali), which is 
involved in disseminating market information and educating agrodealers.  
Main Constraints and Distortions  
The Tendering Process 
The tendering and procurement system is long, tedious, and complicated—it can take four to seven 
months (Table 4.3). It introduces distortions and rent-seeking and inhibits the development of agrodealers 
in rural areas. The tendering system per se introduces risk and uncertainty in market development efforts 
by the private sector. One study estimated that in contrast to direct negotiations with suppliers, the 
CMDT-monitored tendering process added 50 percent to the cost of fertilizers (Chemonics and IFDC 
2007). Considerable time and money could be saved if the POs were allowed to negotiate price directly 
with suppliers. Also, if the cooperative societies were allowed to deal directly with retailers in the area, it 
could reduce transaction costs and allow the development of retail networks. Importers and other 
                                                      
13 The caution technique is a process by which farmers are requested to submit their fertilizer requirements based on area 




suppliers are not interested in developing retail networks because they are not sure of winning the same 
tender every year. 
Table 4.3—Chronogram for the provision of fertilizer in Mali 
Phases/Activities  Cotton Zone: 
GEI  
Office du Niger and Other 
Offices: 
CCAE  
Rainfed and Natural Flooding 
Zones: DNA/DRA and Retail 
Network  
Expression of needs  September (y - 1)   December (y - 1)/January, 
during assessment of 
previous agricultural season 
November/December (y - 1) 
Centralization, formulation, 
and validation of needs 
October (y - 1)  January (y)/February (y)  January (y) 
Search for financing and 
readjustment of orders  
October (y - 1)  February (y)  February (y) 
Launching calls to tender, 
analysis of offers, contracts 
elaboration, and so on 
November/ 
December (y - 1) 
March (y)  March/April (y) 
Delivery and receipt of 
fertilizer, sampling, and 
quality control 
March/April (y)  April/July (y)  June/July/August (y) 
Distribution and placement 
of the fertilizer 
April/May (y)  April/June (y)  July/August (y) 
Payment to suppliers   March/April/May (y)  May/June/July (y)  June/July/August (y) 
Source: Fuentes et al. 2010b.  
Notes: “y - 1” is in reference to the agricultural season during the previous year; likewise “y” is in reference to the agriculture 
season in the current year. GEI = ; CCAE = Commission Centrale pour l'Acquisition d'Engrais; DNA = Directeur National 
d'Agriculture; DRA = Directeur Régional d'Agriculture.  
Limited Access to Finance 
Although interest rates are lower in Mali than in Ghana, getting financing is not easy for smallholder 
farmers (not members of POs) and agrodealers. Farmers who do not have cash at hand cannot benefit 
from the subsidy program.  
Weak Regulatory System 
Mali’s quality control system is reactive rather than proactive. There are no arrangements for checking 
fertilizer quality at the point of sale; nor is there a laboratory to test the products. When someone 
complains, a sample is collected and sent to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, for testing. This process can 
take several weeks, if not months. The quality of blended NPK has become a serious issue, and farmers 
are losing confidence in fertilizer products sold in the market. 
Underdeveloped Retail Networks 
Because of the dominance of the tendering process guided by CMDT and ON, agrodealer networks have 
not developed in the rural areas. Also the skill set of agrodealers is limited, as is market information about 
prices and quantities in different market segments. ORIAM is trying to support the development of 




Fertilizer Policy and Supply Chain in Senegal 
Size of the Market 
Before Senegal introduced structural adjustment programs in the 1990s, fertilizer use varied between 
70,000 and 80,000 product tons per year. During the 1990s, it decreased to less than 40,000 product tons 
per year. In early 2000s, to ensure food security through increased fertilizer use, the Government of 
Senegal introduced a 50 percent fertilizer subsidy for smallholder farmers producing cereals, cotton, 
groundnut, and other crops. The government-subsidized fertilizers accounted for more than 80 percent of 
the market. The remainder is a free market for commercial growers who buy products from importers or 
retailers. The subsidized market is restrictive in that only government-approved and -registered 
importers/wholesalers can participate in the tendering process. Based on the funds available from the 
budget and estimated fertilizer demand, the government invites tenders for supply of fertilizer products. 
Each farmer gets 50 percent of his or her requirements. The remaining 50 percent he or she can buy from 
the open market. Foreign-owned companies are not allowed to participate in the tendering process. Once 
the tenders by product and lot are approved, suppliers procure fertilizer from the international or regional 
market and supply it to regional warehouses. Farmers are responsible for retrieving the fertilizer from 
warehouses. 
The main fertilizer products used in Senegal are urea, DAP, NPK (cotton and groundnut 
formulas), and MOP. Cotton, groundnut, maize, sorghum/millet, vegetables, and sugarcane are the main 
crops fertilized in the country.  
Key Players in the Supply Chain 
In the past, SENCHIM, a marketing subsidiary of ICS (a fertilizer-producing company), had a monopoly 
in the import and distribution of fertilizers. SENCHIM had 10 or less licensed distributors. The economic 
situation of ICS and SENCHIM deteriorated during the 1990s, and in 2004 the Senegalese government 
opened the market to private importers.
14 The distributors who worked for SENCHIM became importers, 
but given the funding and logistic requirements, only a few of them succeeded in becoming sound and 
reliable importers. Figure 4.3 below shows the existing supply system in Senegal. In 2009, five importers 
were awarded tenders (Figure 4.4). Foreign suppliers supply bagged products to domestic importers as 
free-on-truck. From the port, importers arrange transportation to the regional warehouses.
15  
For the cotton sector, SODEFITEX used to import and distribute fertilizer at a subsidized price. 
Due to deteriorating finances caused by low cotton prices, SODEFITEX stopped importing fertilizer. In 
2009, it awarded its tender to Toguna Agro-Industries of Mali, which supplies fertilizer directly to 
SODEFITEX warehouses. From there, the company supplies fertilizer to farmers during the cotton 
harvest. This helps the company reduce transportation costs because inputs are delivered when cotton is 
picked up, but it adds a storage cost and losses for the farmer.  
For commercial crops, importers (Bolton and La Cigogne) import and sell fertilizer to 
commercial farmers at the market price through their marketing channels. There is no subsidy on such 
products. 
Unlike Ghana and Mali, which introduced subsidies during the fertilizer crisis of 2007–2008, 
Senegal introduced fertilizer subsidies (50 percent) in early 2000s. Due to increased prices in the global 
market, Senegal’s fertilizer subsidy bill increased by 60 percent from CFA 8.3 billion ($18.0 million) in 
2007 to CFA 13.3 billion ($28.9 million) in 2008.  
Financing of Fertilizer Import and Use 
Finance for importers and creditworthy farmers is channeled through CNCA (Caisse Nationale de Credit 
Agricole), a national agricultural credit institution created by the Senegalese government in 1984. CNCA 
                                                      
14 Although the market liberalization policy may have been introduced in 2004, it did not become effective until 2006. 
15 During 2008/09 ICS’s blending plant produced only a small quantity of blended products and had insignificant impact on 




provides agricultural credit under a credit guarantee, for which the government deposits in the bank 75 
percent of funds allocated for credit under the agricultural support program. Farmers eligible for credit 
receive a subsidized rate of 7.5 percent, with the government paying the rate differential of 5.5 percent to 
CNCA through the credit guarantee fund.  But the private-sector fertilizer importers receive credit from 

































Source: Fuentes et al. 2010c.  
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Source: Authors, from in-country surveys. 
Warehouse Collateral 
To finance importation, CNCA, in collaboration with the importer, sets up collateral managed by a 
collateral control service firm; imported fertilizer is used as collateral. The imported product is placed in a 
storage facility at the port of Dakar by the international supplier. The collateral control service firm 
releases the fertilizer based on a bank authorization once the importer has paid the international supplier, 
which owns the stored product until it is paid for.  
Main Constraints and Distortions 
Subsidy Program/Tendering Process 
The Government of Senegal’s subsidy program dominates the Senegalese fertilizer market, preventing the 
development of a well-functioning competitive market. Although farmers get only half of their 
requirements through the subsidy system, they are reluctant to purchase the remaining half hoping that the 
government would also pay for the remaining half and thus become victims of the dependency syndrome. 
As the participating suppliers have to be approved by the government, the process leads to rent-seeking 
opportunities. Furthermore, importers are reluctant to import products outside the subsidy domain 
because they do not see an opportunity for developing a market when the subsidy portion accounts for 80 
percent of the market share. However, the payment of subsidy to importers takes a long time—almost a 
year. Such heavy government involvement constrains market development efforts and adds to transaction 
costs.  
Regulatory Frameworks 
Senegal has no systemic arrangement for monitoring and ensuring good-quality products. The 
government appoints an ad hoc committee, the National Committee on Importation of Fertilizers, which is 
responsible for testing the quality of imported fertilizers. However, without  adequate resources, the 
committee has been unable to perform its responsibilities effectively. There is no arrangement for testing 
product quality at the point of sale, where most of the adulteration might be taking place.  













Most fertilizer recommendations are based on fertilizer trials done during the 1970s. Continuous 
cultivation of soils has led to imbalances in nutrient stocks and micronutrient deficiency. Because of 
changing cropping patterns and soil profiles, the efficiency of applied fertilizer is decreasing. This 
situation, combined with adulterated products, has made farmers skeptical about fertilizers that are 
recommended and sold in the market. Additional research, soil testing, and fertilizer trials are needed to 
develop sound crop- and area-specific recommendations.  
Underdeveloped Agrodealer Networks 
Although Senegal has moved from SOE monopoly to a private-sector-based fertilizer import system, the 
government involvement in managing and directing the subsidy through tendering has constrained the 
development of private-sector-based retail networks. Not allowing foreign-owned companies in the tender 
process has created a dualistic market structure. The government should allow competitive market 
development by implementing subsidies through purchasing power support programs at the farmer level.  
Fertilizer Policy and Supply Chain in Nigeria 
Size of the Market 
Nigeria’s fertilizer market is the largest in the West Africa region, consuming approximately 600,000 to 
800,000 product tons per year and accounting for more than 60 percent of the West African market. 
During the early 1990s, Nigeria produced ammonia-urea and NPK products and consumed more than 1 
million tons of product. But with the deterioration of the NAFCON plant, the abrupt removal of subsidies, 
and the withdrawal of the Federal Government of Nigeria’s (FGN’s) Fertilizer Procurement and 
Distribution Division in 1997, fertilizer consumption dropped to around 200,000 product tons. With the 
introduction of subsidies in 1999, fertilizer use slowly increased as FGN purchased increasingly larger 
quantities of fertilizers and allocated them at a 25 percent subsidy to state governments for distribution to 
smallholder farmers. FGN targeted 600,000 tons in 2008 but procured only 464,000 tons due to budget 
constraints. FGN’s direct intervention in the fertilizer market has created many problems including the 
development of a parallel market, round-tripping,
16 uncertainty for investment in market development, 
and delays in payment leading to higher transaction costs.  
The main products Nigeria uses are urea, DAP, MOP, NPK, and specialty fertilizers. Maize is the 
dominant crop fertilized in the country. Other crops include sorghum, millet, cotton, cassava, soybean, 
and fruits and vegetables. 
Key Players in the Supply Chain 
During the early 1990s, the Fertilizer Procurement and Distribution Division had a full monopoly in the 
importation and distribution of fertilizer. In 1997, the fertilizer market was liberalized and subsidies were 
removed. Currently, all fertilizer products are imported by the private sector. The main importers are 
Golden Fertilizers, Tak Continental, and Notore (owner of the former NAFCON fertilizer plant). 
Additionally there are 10 to 12 small importers including fertilizer-blending plants (Figure 4.5).  
The fertilizer marketing and distribution is done by the private sector, but FGN under its subsidy 
program guides a large share of the market, and that creates a big distortion in the market. Various studies 
conducted by IFDC and others have indicated that the fertilizer subsidy program is not benefiting the 
intended beneficiaries (smallholders) and is creating distortions in the market and opportunities for rent-
seeking. Two supply chains dominate the Nigerian fertilizer market. The first is a standard private-sector-
based chain in which importers import fertilizer and supply it to wholesalers and retailers to sell to the 
                                                      
16 A condition when already subsidized fertilizer comes back to the market at a lower price through informal channels, 
crowding out the private-sector agrodealers.  
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farmer. Importers and wholesalers also supply fertilizer products to blending plants. The estimated 
numbers of retailers and wholesalers are approximately 40,000 and 30, respectively.  
The second supply chain consists of fertilizer distributed by FGN through its subsidy program. 
FGN targeted 600,000 tons of products under its subsidy program but distributed 464,000 tons in 2008. It 
procures products from the domestic market through tendering. In 2007 more than 100 companies were 
awarded tenders for distributing fertilizer. Such a large number of suppliers created logistics and 
coordination problems so FGN decided in 2008 to award tenders to only three large importers—Golden, 
Tak Continental, and Notore. Because Notore’s ammonia-urea plant started production only after midyear 
and production remained limited thereafter, the company was forced to import fertilizer to honor its 
commitment. Due to delays in payments from FGN, Tak Continental ran into a cash flow problem and 
was unable to fulfill its supply quota. Therefore tenders were awarded to more suppliers in 2009, but 
delays in budget approval delayed payments to suppliers. In 2010, the budget allocation for subsidies was 
not approved until May 2010. Such delays, though not uncommon in Nigeria, introduce uncertainty in 
fertilizer supply to smallholder farmers. 
Fertilizer procured by FGN is distributed to various states on the basis of the needs of smallholder 
farmers, but political considerations generally outweigh the economic rationale. In any case, once the 
tenders are awarded, suppliers are required to supply the product to regional warehouses at the state level. 
From there, state governments distribute it plus fertilizer procured with their own funds to local 
governments, which distribute it to smallholder farmers. State and local governments often provide 
additional subsidies, making the total subsidy at times greater than 70 percent of the market price. Such 
generous subsidies crowd the private sector out of the market. 
Subsidized fertilizer is distributed at a pan-territorial price all over the country. FGN contracts the 
quantity of fertilizer from the private sector and allocates it to various states at 75 percent of the price (25 
percent of the subsidy is paid by FGN). In theory states are supposed to pay 75 percent of the cost of the 
fertilizer, but it rarely happens. So FGN deducts the remaining cost from allocated funds to states in the 
budget or from monthly payments to states from the oil funds. Delinquencies or delays on the part of 
states can cause considerable delays in payment to the private sector. Moreover, as the subsidized 
fertilizer program accounts for more than 70 percent of the fertilizer market, it leaves a limited share of 
the market for private-sector involvement. 
Rent-seeking is not uncommon in this process, but most disturbing is that a significant proportion 
of subsidized fertilizer comes to the open market (round-tripping) and is sold at below the market price. 
This creates unfair competition in the market, leading to uncertainty and losses for the market players and 
discouraging private-sector investment in the development of agrodealer networks.  
Main Constraints and Distortions  
Uncertain Policy Environment 
FGN’s interference in the market remains the biggest hurdle in the development of a competitive, 
efficient, and effective fertilizer supply chain. In addition to round-tripping, delays of almost a year in the 
payment of subsidy funds to suppliers create cash flow problems for importers and wholesalers and add to 
transaction costs. Furthermore, FGN’s intentions about the quantity of fertilizer to be procured remain 
unpredictable because the government cannot issue tenders unless the budget is approved. Technically the 
budget is supposed to be approved in January but can be delayed until April or May. This prevents 
importers from forward planning about imports when the prices may be lower in the global market. 
Different subsidy regimes followed by state governments introduce further uncertainty in planning. Some 
states such as Kano and Taraba have moved from direct procurement of fertilizer to giving purchasing 
power support to farmers through vouchers. In this approach, eligible smallholder farmers are given 
vouchers to support the cost of fertilizer so that there is no direct intervention in the market. Yet because 
of uncertainty in FGN’s programs, states are in no position to announce in advance the quantity of 
fertilizer supported by vouchers. This creates uncertainty in market development and sales planning.   
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INTERNATIONAL FERTILIZER PRODUCERS/SUPPLIERS IN EUROPE AND ASIA 
Nigeria Private Importers 
Private Importers under States Subsidies 






























Source: Fuentes et al. 2010d. 
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Ineffective Regulatory System 
The privatization of fertilizer importation and marketing was not accompanied by an effective regulatory 
system. This has led to adulteration and low-quality blended products. A fertilizer law was drafted , but 
FGN has not enacted the law and devoted adequate resources to develop the necessary legal instruments 
and to train a cadre of inspectors who can spot-check the product at the point of sale.  
Inefficiencies at the Port 
The shallow depth (8 to 10 meters) of Port Harcourt does not allow the berthing of ships carrying more 
than 15,000 tons cargo. A discharge rate of 1,000 product tons per day adds significant costs in demurrage 
and stevedoring. Although all three major importers have their storage facilities at the port, all bagging 
has to be done at the port because there is no facility for bulk movement. In a large market of almost 
600,000 to 800,000 tons, transportation of product by road becomes very costly. Among domestic costs, 
transportation costs account for $80 to $100 a ton. If shipping costs are added to this, shipping and 
transportation alone accounts for nearly a third of the delivered cost of fertilizer. The main reason 
transportation costs are high in Nigeria is that more than 80 percent of its fertilizer use is concentrated in 
the northern part of the country, up to 1,600 kilometers from the ports located in the south. To reduce 
transportation costs, FGN should consider investing in railway transportation for the bulk movement of 
fertilizer products.  
Underdeveloped Agrodealer Networks 
Uncertainty and inconsistency in the government’s policy (subsidy [1996], no subsidy [1997–1998], 
subsidy [1999], no subsidy [2000], and subsidy again [2001]) has discouraged the private sector from 
developing dealer networks in rural areas. After liberalization and privatization in 1997, the private sector 
invested in the development of dealer networks. But with the introduction of subsidies in 1999, importers 
were forced to deliver products at local farm service centers. In 2007, one company sold products on 
credit, but recovery was poor and it lost $3 million and stopped developing dealer networks. FGN has 
expended little effort in building human capital in the rural areas.  
Comparative Summary 
The brief analysis of fertilizer markets in selected West African countries reveals the following 
similarities and contrasts. First, Nigeria’s fertilizer market dominates the other markets in the region, 
accounting for more than 60 percent of West Africa’s fertilizer consumption. Urea, DAP, MOP, and NPK 
(granulated and blended) are commonly used. Foodcrops and export crops get fertilized. The markets in 
most countries except Nigeria are too small to benefit from economies of scale in procurement.  
Second, each country has three to four major importers and 10 to 15 wholesalers. Nigeria has the 
most agrodealers, and Senegal the fewest. Supply chains operating in the countries include features of 
both private-sector-based competitive markets and SOE-managed or -directed distribution systems.  
Third, among the key constraints facing the four countries, the presence of a nonconducive policy 
environment forms a bottleneck in the development of competitive fertilizer markets. Ghana and Mali 
introduced fertilizer subsidies in response to the 2007–2008 food and fertilizer crisis, whereas Nigeria and 
Senegal have been subsidizing fertilizer since 2000. The subsidy implementation arrangements in all 
countries have introduced distortions and fragmentations in the market. For example, procurement of 
fertilizers for subsidy programs is done through tendering, which introduces risk and uncertainty in 
market development. More market-friendly subsidy options, such as vouchers, are not as common.  
Fourth, enforcement of quality regulations is weak in all the countries. Mali has no laboratories to 
test the quality of products; samples are sent to Burkina Faso for testing, which delays the whole process. 
Finally, access to financing by fertilizer traders at all levels is limited in all the countries, 
although the national government provides limited credit guarantees in Senegal and Mali. Senegal 
provides another exception: a warehouse collateral system is practiced wherein global or regional 
suppliers deposit products in a warehouse managed by an agency that works in collaboration with the  
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national agricultural credit bank. This arrangement helps importers by reducing the funds needed for 
collateral for getting a letter of credit for imports from banks.  
In the next section, we discuss how these features and constraints affect the performance of 
fertilizer markets in West Africa in general, drawing on some lessons to date, and considering the 
development of a common regional fertilizer market.  
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5.  THE FUNCTIONING OF FERTILIZER MARKETS  
From the discussion of fertilizer policies and supply chains in selected countries in Section 4, it is clear 
that distortions and bottlenecks contribute to inefficiencies of fertilizer markets in West Africa. Based on 
the evidence from country studies combined with secondary data sources, the current functioning of 
fertilizer markets in West Africa is evaluated in more detail here. To do this we apply the structure–
conduct–performance (S–C–P) evaluation model along the different stages of the fertilizer supply chain.  
The S–C–P Approach 
The S–C–P approach tries to understand how industrial markets function in the real world as opposed to 
in theory (for details on the approach see Holtzman 2002 and Wanzala, Bumb, and Groot 2009). The 
underlying rationale for this approach emanates from economic theory of competitive markets. It is 
generally believed that competitive markets (with large numbers of buyers and sellers in the market) 
produce efficient prices and quantities (traded). If one supplier (monopoly) or a few suppliers (oligopoly) 
dominate a market, the lack of competition yields higher prices and lower quantities traded. Therefore 
many researchers have studied the industrial markets by first examining the structure of the market 
(number of sellers) and then examining the performance of the market (prices and quantities traded). If 
the market structure is monopolistic or oligopolistic, then prevailing prices may be higher than what they 
would be in a competitive market. The S–C–P approach thus first looks at the structure of the market 
(number of actors involved), then their conduct (what services they perform), and how those two things 
lead to the performance of the market—in terms of prices, quantities traded, and costs of performing 
various functions. Based on this analysis, one can draw policy conclusions about the performance of the 
market and possible measures needed to improve it (measured in terms of price and accessibility). 
However, as we are going to show, in Africa in general and West Africa in particular, nonprice factors 
including policy and the institutional environment may have more influence on the performance of the 
fertilizer market than just the structure and conduct of the participants.  
Structure of the Fertilizer Markets 
Although some of the importers have multicountry operations (importing and distributing fertilizer in 
more than one country), there is no well-established regional fertilizer market. At the country level, the 
structure of the fertilizer market resembles a pyramid—with suppliers and shipping companies in the 
global market, importers and wholesalers (along with bankers, transporters, and port authorities) at the 
national level, and agrodealers and farmers at the local level (Figure 5.1). Whereas the global fertilizer 
market is highly competitive, national fertilizer markets are oligopolistic at the import level and generally 
competitive at the wholesale and retail levels. Typically, three to five importers, 5 to 30 wholesalers, and 
300 to 4,000 retailers operate at the country level where the size of the market is more than 50,000 
product tons. In smaller markets, these numbers are lower. For example, only two traders were importing 
and marketing fertilizer in Sierra Leone in 2007.  
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Source: Wanzala, Bumb, and Groot 2009. 
Although this generalized market structure prevails in many markets, several variants of the 
fertilizer supply chain exist in West Africa. In some supply chains, estate crop owners, SOEs (CMDT in 
Mali and COCOBOD in Ghana), or government departments import fertilizer products directly from the 
global market or regional markets and distribute inputs to farmers (in exchange for crop produce—an 
interlocked arrangement), thereby bypassing importers, wholesalers, and retailers. In others, 
nongovernmental organizations and producer organizations deal directly with wholesalers and supply 
inputs to farmers, thereby bypassing retailers (Gregory and Bumb 2006). In some cases where subsidy has 
been reintroduced, government departments issue tenders or negotiate the delivered price at the farmgate 
(Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal). All these interventions, especially the use of tenders, compromise 
market efficiency and introduce risk and uncertainty for private-sector investment in market development.  
The fertilizer industry is capital intensive and logistically demanding; it requires a huge up-front 
investment for production (plants producing more than 500,000 tons of product generate substantial 
economies of scale in production). In procurement also, shipments of 25,000 to 50,000 tons generate 
economies in prices and shipping. The large amount of financing needed for production or large-size 
imports creates a natural monopoly in small markets. Therefore, importers having access to financing in 
the international markets tend to dominate the market. High interest rates, stringent collateral 
requirements, and limited access to financing make it difficult for traders to become fertilizer importers of 
significant size. Small importers import small shipments at high prices. 
Nobel laureate Ronald Coase once mentioned that an economist who cannot fathom a business 
practice “looks for a monopoly explanation.”
 (The Economist 2009: p68). Many researchers have a 
tendency to blame the monopoly or oligopoly in fertilizer procurement as a prime cause of high fertilizer 
prices in African countries. As we will show, many nonprice factors contribute to high prices in West 
Africa. As long as there is freedom of entry or exit and transparency in the market, the oligopolistic 
structure of the market per se should not be considered a disadvantage because a large number of 
importers importing in small shipments will end up raising fertilizer prices. The high prices and profits 
charged by monopolists or oligopolists may attract new importers and reduce prices and improve  
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accessibility, provided finance is not a constraint. The entry of new importers into the market in Malawi 
in 2004 and in Mali in 2007 significantly reduced the prices of fertilizer and crop protection products 
(CPPs)in those countries (Chemonics and IFDC 2007). 
It should be recognized that because of economies of scale and logistic requirements, the 
structure of the market per se does not indicate the performance of the market. Transportation bottlenecks 
in rural areas and transportation costs for landlocked countries add significantly to the cost of fertilizer at 
the farmgate. Regulatory and policy constraints further affect the functioning and performance of the 
market. To judge the performance of the market, one should use a broader, holistic approach based on the 
five pillars of market development—policy, finance, human capital, market transparency, and regulatory 
systems—as well as trade regimes and transportation networks (IFDC 2003).  
Conduct of the Main Players 
Since West African countries satisfy most of their fertilizer requirements through imports, West African 
fertilizer importers are pricetakers
17 in the global market. The importers negotiate contracts (directly or 
indirectly) with global suppliers (manufacturers and traders) and import different fertilizer products. 
Global suppliers supply the product, and the shipping companies bring the product to the port of entry, 
where port authorities do inspection and charge tariffs and taxes. In some countries port authorities also 
bag the product. Forwarding and handling agents ensure that all paperwork is complete and that the 
product meets the specifications of the contract. International and national banks play a crucial role in 
supplying financing through a letter of credit for importers. Table 5.1 shows the main multicountry 
importers operating in West Africa. 
From here, the importers sell the product to wholesalers who arrange for storage, transportation, 
and payment of local taxes. Wholesalers sell the product to agrodealers (retailers and small stockists) who 
sell it to farmers. Most agrodealers are finance constrained. 
Table 5.1—Importers having multi-country presence 
Importing Company  Multicountry Presence  Comments 
Yara  Ghana, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire  Associated with Yara International 
Golden Stork/La Cigogne  Ghana, Mali, Senegal  Subsidiary of Belgian-French corporation 
La Cigogne-SCPA SIVEX 
Dizengoff  Ghana  Subsidiary of British-Israeli company 
Bolton 
Bolton  Senegal   
Toguna Agro-Industries  Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso   
Source: Authors, from in-country surveys. 
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has introduced credit guarantee schemes 
in Mali, Nigeria, and Ghana to link agrodealers with commercial banks, but the scope of such programs is 
limited. The national governments in Mali and Senegal provide limited guarantees for smallholders and 
importers. 
Given that many countries have small markets, the distinction between importers and wholesalers 
is blurred; importers act as wholesalers, and vice versa. In a new market model developed by IFDC and 
other organizations, many agrodealers also work as technology transfer agents. 
                                                      
17 A single importer does not have influence on the market price; however, depending on the size of shipment, importers 
may get a price different from the market price.   
48 
Although West African importers are pricetakers in the global market, it should be stressed that 
not all importers have easy access to suppliers and shipping companies. Because of savings in transaction 
costs, most global suppliers like to deal with large buyers, and therefore small buyers may not get the 
product at the same price as large buyers do. Likewise, shipping companies prefer to ship full loads of 
25,000 to 50,000 tons. Both of these characteristics of the global market add extra costs for small 
importers in African markets. For this reason, a common fertilizer market for West Africa would generate 
savings in procurement and shipping when large quantities are ordered for the whole regional market.  
From this brief description of the structure and conduct of the market, one sees that many constraints 
related to finance, human capital (knowledge and skill of actors involved), shipping and transportation, 
and the regulatory and policy environment can affect the performance of the fertilizer market. We 
elaborate on such constraints in Section 6.  
Performance of the Fertilizer Markets 
With the caveats mentioned earlier, market performance is assessed by looking at the various cost 
components of the supply chain in a comparative framework. First, we analyze the performance of 
fertilizer markets at the country level. That is followed by a comparative analysis of markets in the global 
context.  
Performance of Country Markets 
We looked at the main players in the Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal supply chains in Section 4. Here, 
we analyze the performance of key players in the supply chain as reflected in different domestic cost 
elements. Figures 5.2 through 5.5 provide information about the structural pyramid of players, functions, 
and performance of the fertilizer markets in Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Nigeria. These pyramids report 
information about various cost components related to domestic marketing and distribution of fertilizer. 
We provide a comparative analysis of each country’s costs of procurement from international markets in 
the next subsection. 
Domestic marketing and distribution costs add nearly 100 percent of the cost, insurance, and 
freight (CIF) import price in Ghana (Figure 5.2). Among the domestic costs, finance charges account for 
32 percent, transportation costs make up approximately 21 percent, and marketing margins (by importers 
and retailers) constitute 27 percent. High interest charges of 30 to 35 percent add significantly to financial 
costs. Delays in subsidy payment and the risk of devaluation caution importers to charge a higher 
premium on the cost of selling fertilizer. Because the product is moved from Tema port in the south to 
fertilizer-consuming areas in the central and northern parts of the country, transportation charges account 
for a larger share than other components like port charges, and taxes and duties do.  
In contrast to Ghana, domestic marketing and distribution costs add only 32 percent to the CIF 
price in Mali (Figure 5.3). However the CIF price is higher in Mali than in Ghana because of in-transit 
transportation costs from Dakar or Abidjan to Bamako. Financing and transportation charges account for 
more than 50 percent of the total domestic cost. Because there are no facilities for bulk transportation 
from Dakar to Bamako, importers have to import fertilizer products in bags, open the bags to produce 
blended products, and then re-bag them.  This process doubles the cost of bagging fertilizers in Mali. 
Marketing margins account for 27 percent of the domestic cost.  
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Figure 5.2—Performance of supply chain in Ghana 
           Environment  Fertilizer Supply Chain  Performance 
a 
 
International procurement and 
processing/blending 
Three importers and blenders 
negotiate retail price with 
government. Estimated importer 
marketing cost and margin 
average 20% (US$3.1/50 kg bag) 
of domestic cost. 
 
Port services and stevedores 
 (for unloading and bagging services) 
Port charges average 18% 
(US$2.67/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost. 
 
Credit for procurement  
Up to 30% interest rate with 
100% or more collateral. Finance 
costs along the domestic supply 
chain, average 32% (US$4.6/50 kg 
bag) of domestic cost. 
 
Movement of product from 
Port  to domestic markets 
Transportation costs along the 
domestic supply chain (from port 
to retailer) average 21% 
(US$3.16/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost.  
 
Distribution of product 
through domestic 
 retail (or other) outlets 
Estimated distribution margins of 
the domestic distribution 
network average 7% (US$1.08/50 
kg bag) of domestic cost. 
 
 
  Demand and access 
to product 
Fertilizer cost to farmers at retail 
doubles (US$15.17/50 kg bag) 
relative to CIF cost. 
b 
Source: Fuentes et al. 2010a. 
Notes:
 a Performance indicators are average percentages and monetary values across different products on a 50 kilogram bag.  
b Government charges account for 3.8% (US$0.62/50kg bag) of domestic cost. 




































































































































Figure 5.3—Performance of supply chain in Mali 
           Environment  Fertilizer Supply Chain  Performance 
a 
 
International procurement and 
processing/blending 
Apparently competitive tender with 
imports dominated by two providers. 
Estimated marketing cost and margin 
average 26.8% (US$3.09/50 kg bag) of 
domestic cost. Importers share of this 
cost is not well known but believed to 
be a large proportion. 
 
Port services and stevedores 
 (for unloading and bagging services) 
Port charges average 11.8% 
(US$1.34/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost. 
 
Credit for procurement and       
consumption  
Interest rate of 8.5% if subsidized 
and Up to 13% non-subsidized 
with collateral. Cumulative 
finance cost along the domestic 
supply chain, average 27.1% 
(US$3.13/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost. 
 
Movement of product from 
port  to domestic markets 
Transportation costs along the 
domestic supply chain average 
25.1% (US$2.87/50 kg bag). If 
considering all transportation 
costs from port (outside Mali) to 
retail, it increases to about 44% 
(US$6.84) of domestic cost.  
 
Distribution of product 
through domestic 
 retail (or other) outlets 
Small private dist. network, not well 
developed. Estimated marketing 
costs and margins average 26.8% 
(US$3.09/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost.  Share of distribution network 
not well known but believed to be a 
smaller proportion than importers. 
 
 
  Demand and access 
to product 
Fertilizer cost to farmers at delivery 
point increases by an average of 
31.7% (US$12.3/50 kg bag) of 
domestic cost; [or 42.7% 
(US$15.46) relative to CIF cost 
including in transit transport 
outside Mali.] 
b   
 
Source: Fuentes et al. 2010b. 
Notes:
 a Performance indicators are average percentages and monetary values across different products on a 50 kilogram bag.  
b Government charges account for 9.2% of domestic cost. 
As in Mali, domestic marketing and distribution costs add only a third to the CIF price in Senegal 
(Figure 5.4). Financing and transportation charges account for more than one-half of the domestic cost, 
and marketing margins by importers and retailers nearly one-fourth. Uncertainty introduced by 
government tendering adds significantly to marketing margins in Senegal. Unlike in Ghana, where 
government taxes and levies account for less than 4 percent, government taxes account for 12 percent of 













































































































































Figure 5.4—Senegal fertilizer supply chain structure and performance 
           Environment  Fertilizer Supply Chain  Performance 
a 
 
International procurement and 
processing/blending 
3 to 5 Importers negotiate retail 
price with government. Estimated 
importer marketing cost and 
margin average 16.5% 
(US$1.83/50 kg) out of 25% of 
domestic cost. 
 
Port services and stevedores 
 (for unloading & bagging services) 
Port charges average 10% 
(US$1.13/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost. 
 
Credit for procurement  
and distribution  
7.5% interest rate subsidized, up 
to 16% non-subsidized. Finance 
costs along the domestic supply 
chain, average 25% (US$2.87/50 
kg bag) of domestic cost. 
 
Movement of product from 
Port  to domestic markets 
Transportation costs along the 
domestic supply chain (from port 
to retailer) average 28% 
(US$3.22/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost.  
 
Distribution of product 
through domestic 
 retail (or other) outlets 
Estimated distribution margins of the 
domestic network average 9% 
(US$1.03/50 kg bag) out of 25% of 
domestic cost where the differential 
16% (US$1.86) accrue to importers. 
 
 
  Demand and access 
to product 
Fertilizer cost to farmers at retail 
increase by an average of 34% 
(US$11.41/50 kg bag) relative to 
CIF cost. 
b   
Source: Fuentes et al. 2010c. 
Notes:
 a Performance indicators are average percentages and monetary values across different products on a 50 kilogram bag.  
b Government charges account for 11.7% (US$1. 34/50kg bag) of domestic cost. 
In Nigeria, domestic marketing and distribution costs add 42 percent to the CIF price (Figure 5.5). 
However, transportation costs account for nearly 30 percent of the domestic costs—a result of both long 
distances (over 1,000 kilometers) between ports and consuming areas and inefficiencies in the 
transportation sector. More than a fifth of the domestic cost is for marketing margins by importers. Policy 
uncertainty and round-tripping create risk and uncertainty and force importers to allow for higher 
margins. Improvements in several of these areas could lead to lower transaction costs and reduced prices 
for farmers. 












































































































































Figure 5.5—Performance of supply chain in Nigeria 
           Environment  Fertilizer Supply Chain  Performance 
a 
 
International procurement and 
processing/blending 
Apparently competitive; however 
a dual system in response to 
federal and state governments 
subsidies. Importers negotiate 
retail price with government. Est. 
importer marketing costs and 
margin average 22% (US$3.56/50 
kg) of domestic cost. 
 
Port services and stevedores 
 (for unloading and bagging services) 
Port charges average 18.5% 
(US$2.89/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost. 
 
Credit for procurement  
and distribution  
Up to 17% interest rate with 
collateral. Finance cost along the 
domestic supply chain, average 
22.6% (US$3.90/50 kg bag) of 
domestic cost. 
 
Movement of product from 
Port  to domestic markets 
Transportation Cost along the 
domestic supply chain (from port 
to retailer) average 29.6% 
(US$4.6/50 kg bag) of domestic 
cost.  
 
Distribution of product 
through domestic 
 retail (or other) outlets 
Domestic distribution margins of 
fertilizer accrue almost in its 
entirety to importers since they 
are also in charge of distribution 




Demand and access 
to product 
Fertilizer cost to farmers at retail 
increase by an average of 42% 
(US$ 14.83/50 kg bag) relative to 
CIF cost. 
b   
 
Source: Fuentes et al. 2010d. 
Notes:
 a Performance indicators are average percentages and monetary values across different products on a 50 kilogram bag.  
b Government charges account for 7.6% ((US$1.23/50kg bag) of domestic cost. 
Comparative Analysis of Fertilizer Costs 
Figure 5.6 compares supply cost components in the global context—a large fertilizer market in an Asian 
country (Thailand), a small fertilizer market in a coastal African country (Tanzania), and a small fertilizer 
market in a landlocked African country (Mali). The data refer to 2006. Although all three countries have 
similar, though not identical, FOB (free-on-board-- means the supplier will load the product on the ship 
free of charge, that is, the price includes handling charges from the factory to the ship; ex-factory price 
means the buyer has to pay for moving the product from the factory gate to the ship) prices for urea, 
transportation costs account for about a third of the retail price in Mali (landlocked) and a fifth in 
Tanzania (coastal), but only 11 percent in Thailand. Thus, long distances and inefficiencies in 
transportation add significantly to retail fertilizer prices in West Africa. All other costs (finance, 
marketing margins, overhead, and taxes) account for 8 percent of the retail price in Thailand but 19 






















































































































































Source: Chemonics and IFDC 2007.  
Note: FOB – Free on Board. 
Because of the small market size and risky nature of operations, total margins are much higher in 
Mali (8 percent) than in Thailand (3 percent). Financing costs and taxes are also higher in Mali (10 
percent) than in Thailand (5 percent). Although geographical distances are much longer in Africa 
countries than in Asian countries, such as India or Thailand, inefficiencies in transportation networks add 
significantly to the delivered price of fertilizers in Mali and other African countries. Such inefficiencies in 
transportation networks in Africa add to high transportation costs and serve as a trade barrier in general 
(Amjadi and Yeates 1995). Reducing transportation costs by improving the efficiency of transportation 
networks can have a significant impact on farmgate fertilizer prices in West Africa. Improving access to 
finance and reducing taxes are also critical to improving the performance of the fertilizer market. 
Figure 5.7 provides data on the cost structure of different products in West Africa. The CIF cost of urea 
varies between $322/ton in Ghana to $371/ton in Nigeria. Both the size of the shipment and the source of 
procurement can affect urea price. Importers in Ghana are importing from Black Sea suppliers, where 
urea is generally cheaper than that from Arab Gulf sources.  
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Figure 5.7—Supply chain cost components by fertilizer products in select countries in 2009 
(US$/metric ton)  
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
For blended NPK products, the price is much higher in Mali than it is in other countries. As 
mentioned earlier, Mali incurs an additional $79/ton for in-transit transportation from Dakar to Bamako or 
Abidjan to Bamako. In addition, custom NPK products for cotton crops cost more than standard NPK 15-
15-15 produced for the global market. The CIF price for NPK 15-15-15 is $151/ton lower than that for 
blended NPK (especially the cotton formula). Even allowing for the cost of sulfur and boron in the cotton 
formula, the difference of $151/ton is on the high side. If the in-transit cost of transportation is added, the 
CIF cost at the Mali border for blended NPK is $623/ton—very high. This indicates that rationalization or 
the removal of artificial product differentiation of the cotton formula and its large-scale production in 
West Africa could yield significant savings.  
It is rather surprising that for both urea and NPK 15-15-15, CIF prices are much higher in Senegal 
(a coastal country) than in Mali (landlocked country) or Ghana (coastal country). Inefficiency and 
uncertainty of tendering leading to rent-seeking may explain a part of this difference. However, this area 
needs further research.  CIF prices account for 51 to 71 percent of the product prices in different 
countries. On the other hand, domestic marketing and transportation costs vary between 29 percent 
(blended NPK products in Mali) and 49 percent (urea in Ghana). Even with a large market (more than 
500,000 tons product), Nigeria does not seem to enjoy the lowest prices for its products. This may be a 
result of distortions and informal charges introduced by Nigeria’s nonconducive policy environment. The 
Federal Government of Nigeria targets to procure 400,000 to 600,000 tons of products for its subsidy 
program through tenders. Uncertainty of budget allocations, delays in payments, and parallel market 
operations (round-tripping) prevents the private sector from obtaining timely cost-effective price deals in 
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Among the domestic marketing and distribution components (Figure 5.8), financing, 
transportation, and marketing costs account for 70 to 80 percent of the total cost. NPK blends have the 
highest financing cost, and urea has the lowest marketing/distribution cost. Domestic transport cost varies 
between $69/ton and $73/ton. High transport costs reflect both long distances and inefficient transport 
services in West Africa. Taxes and government levies amount to $17 to $25 per ton, a charge that can be 
significantly reduced. Port charges vary between $35 and $42 a ton. Whereas taxes account for a smaller 
percentage of total cost, processing delays and rent-seeking opportunities add to transaction costs. 
Figure 5.8—Supply chain cost components—domestic marketing costs (averaged across all four 
countries in the sample), (US$/metric ton) in 2009 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
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6.  CONSTRAINTS AFFECTING THE FUNCTIONING OF FERTILIZER MARKETS 
We discussed the key constraints affecting the fertilizer supply chains in Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and 
Nigeria in Section 4. In this section we synthesize the country-specific constraints to develop a unified 
regional scenario highlighting common constraints.  
Both supply-side and demand-side constraints affect the functioning and performance of West 
Africa’s fertilizer markets. But it is the supply-side constraints that have a major impact on the supply 
price, which in turn affects fertilizer demand at the regional and national levels. These constraints affect 
both the accessibility and affordability of fertilizer in rural areas by increasing the transaction costs at 
each stage in the supply chain. Improving the efficiency of the supply chain not only improves the cost 
and accessibility of fertilizers for the farmer but also helps in reducing fiscal costs of providing fertilizer 
subsidies or purchasing power support to resource-poor farmers (as many countries did in 2008). Without 
improvements in the efficiency of the supply chain, national governments end up subsidizing distortions 
in the supply price. We therefore discuss the constraints affecting the supply side of the market equation 
first, followed by demand-side constraints. 
Supply-Side Constraints 
Nonconducive Policy Environment 
In many countries, the fertilizer policy environment is not conducive to the development of competitive 
fertilizer markets at both the national and regional levels. Although the price support programs initiated in 
2008 (following the global food price crisis) were well intentioned, the implementation modalities used 
have not been efficient. First, for example, tendering was introduced to procure fertilizer from local or 
international markets. But tendering adds risk and uncertainty to market development while also creating 
opportunities for rent-seeking. There is also a danger that resulting prices can turn out to be higher than 
those set through negotiations, as occurred in Mali in 2007 when the price for the CMDT tender was 50 
percent higher than the price achieved through direct negotiations (Chemonics and IFDC 2007). Second, 
in most countries the government controlled the price for subsidized fertilizer without making adequate 
provisions for profit margins at the retail stage. Third, countries that introduced subsidy vouchers, such as 
Ghana, made inadequate arrangements for redemption of vouchers at the supplier level thereby blocking 
the supply chain and preventing many retailers from participating in the voucher market (Karusova and 
Banful 2010). In the end, this fragmented already thin markets. Finally, different countries follow 
different subsidy regimes, varying from 25 percent in Nigeria (at the federal level)18 to 50 percent in 
Senegal. Such variation in price between countries leads to smuggling and rent-seeking, thereby 
discouraging regional trade.  
Tariffs, Taxes, and Trade Restrictions  
Although fertilizer is exempt from a “common external tariff” of 5 percent on all imported goods in the 
ECOWAS region, some member states have not exempted fertilizer from this duty. Additionally, some 
countries impose a value-added tax in the range of 0 to 18 percent and other levies. For example, both 
Ghana and Mali impose an unnecessary and irrelevant shipper and council tax (Table 6.1 below). The 
taxes are small relative the final retail price, but they add unnecessary burdens in processing paperwork 
and opportunities for rent-seeking, which leads to delays in unloading and transporting fertilizer. Since 
fertilizer is a seasonal commodity, “fertilizer delayed is fertilizer denied.” In addition to taxes, regulatory 
measures do not allow the movement of products from one country to another because they do not meet 
country-specific product specifications, such as the cotton formula (discussed further below).  
                                                      
18 The final subsidies farmers receive can be as high as 70 percent if additional subsidies provided by local and state 
governments are included.  
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Poor Quality Regulation 
Many countries in West Africa had a public-sector monopoly in input distribution before structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) were introduced during the 1980s and the early 1990s. Under the SAPs, 
subsidies were removed, prices were decontrolled, imports were liberalized, and input distribution was 
privatized (Bumb and Baanabte 1996, Narayan and Bumb 1995). However, capacity for quality control, 
standards and measures, and truth-in-labeling was not strengthened, such that most countries still have 
inadequate regulatory systems. Although fertilizer laws exist in Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Mali, 
national regulatory services lack sufficient resources to implement them at the point of sale or enforce 
them. Different standards in various countries also prevent the movement of product from one country to 
another. In the framework of the implementation of its Common Agricultural Policy (including its 
fertilizer strategy following the Abuja Declaration), ECOWAS is trying to address these shortfalls. For 
example, it has embarked on a process to develop and adopt a regional regulatory framework on fertilizer 
quality control, as well as other necessary supporting regulations. 
Table 6.1—Summary of various taxes each country faces 
Country  Taxes  Comments 
Ghana  ECOWAS statistical and community solidarity and 
withholding tax (2.5%);  
IRS and EPA processing fee; 
Custom, excise, and preventive services fee;  
Ghana Shipper and Council Tax (GSCT) 
The GSCT, introduced in 
the 1960s, serves no 
purpose as the GSCT 
institution does not exist. 
Mali  ECOWAS statistical and community solidarity and 
withholding tax (2.5%);  
ADIT tax, shipper and council tax, and transit tax (by 
Senegal) 
The ADIT tax is an advance 
payment for tariffs but 
rarely gets returned to 
importer. 
Nigeria  ECOWAS statistical and community solidarity and 
withholding tax (2.5%);   
Nigerian withholding tax 5%; 
Other taxes and levies (US$19.18/metric ton) 
The 5% withholding tax 
should be removed. 
Senegal  ECOWAS statistical and community solidarity and 
withholding tax (2.5%);  
other taxes and levies (US$30.4/metric ton) 
 
Source: Fuentes et al. 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, and 2010d. 
Notes:  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) tax is levied on all imports to support the ECOWAS 
Commission’s operations. In the long run, the ECOWAS Commission should find alternative sources of funding for its 
operations. EPA = Economic Partnership Agreement; IRS = Internal Revenue Service; ADIT = an advance payment for tariffs in 
Mali. 
The presence of unnecessary government regulations at the import level can also add costly 
delays, such as quality control inspections that are unnecessary when international inspection companies 
like SGS, COTECNA, and others have already done so prior to shipping.
19 It should be underscored that 
quality is generally more of an issue for blended NPK than for straight products like urea and DAP that 
are imported and sold in 50 kg bags.  
                                                      
19 The issue here is the mandatory inspections by the government.  
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Inadequate Market Information and Linkages 
Although considerable effort has been devoted to the establishment of market information systems for key 
agricultural commodities, such as, maize, rice, coffee, cocoa, and cotton,
20 less effort has been put into 
establishing regional and national information systems for agricultural inputs. The lack of market 
information prevents traders in different countries from linking up with one another and benefiting from 
lower prices. It also hinders the integration of different segments of the market. Such a lack of 
information inflates prices and reduces accessibility. Also many small importers are not fully informed 
about prices in the global market and therefore end up paying higher than normal prices. Market 
transparency and connectivity are essential to promote well-functioning regional markets in West Africa. 
Recently, ECOWAS initiated efforts to establish market information links under its Agricultural 
Information Systems (AGRIS) program, and under the Marketing Inputs Regionally Plus (MIR Plus) 
program, it has started input data collection. However, such efforts need further strengthening at the 
country and interregional levels. 
Limited Access to Financing 
The capital-intensive nature of the fertilizer industry implies that fertilizer procurement and marketing 
requires large sums of money for investment. For example, to import, say, 20,000 tons of urea, an 
importer might need $6 to $8 million to buy the product in the global market at 2010 prices. For a local 
importer in Mali or Ghana to raise such funds is not possible because local banks charge high interest 
rates (20 to 30 percent) and require 150 percent collateral. As a result, local importers have relied on 
importing smaller lots—1,000 or 5,000 product ton thereby restricting the growth of fertilizer markets and 
rural-based agrodealers. Some promising opportunities may emerge from the Africa Fertilizer Financing 
Mechanism, UEMOA’s Regional Agricultural Development Fund, and ECOWAS’s Agricultural 
Development Fund. Another option would be to explore the use of Development Credit Authority
21 funds 
to provide loan guarantees to promote the development of large importers.  
Product Differentiation 
Different soils and crops need different amounts of nutrients for proper growth, but in West Africa 
product differentiation has taken place for nontechnical reasons. For example, as Table 3.2 shows, 
fertilizer product recommendations for cotton are different across countries despite their having similar 
soil and climate characteristics (for example, Mali’s NPK ratios versus those of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina 
Faso). Since these differentiated products are not produced for the global market, they have to be custom 
made at a small scale. This unnecessarily adds to production costs, and thus price. If the cotton formula 
were harmonized across countries, significant savings could be achieved, as high as $30 to $40 per ton 
(Table 6.2 below). Similar savings could also be generated by encouraging local blending capacities. 
Investment in a granulation plant for the region could also be justified because the market would be large 
enough to generate economies of scale. 
Transportation Bottlenecks 
After the CIF cost, transportation costs within and across countries make up the second biggest 
component of the fertilizer price, especially for landlocked countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
Niger. For large countries such as Nigeria, transportation costs can also account for a large share of 
                                                      
20 Some examples: The West-African Market Information Network (WAMIN, or the French acronym, RESIMAO) mostly 
looks at output commodity prices. A new innovative market information exchange system, esoko at www.esoko.com, uses 
mobile phone technologies and the Internet (originally referred to as tradenet). Finally, among a smaller set of countries 
neighboring Mali, Michigan State University is proposing to set up a West Africa Market Information Project based on its Mali 
experience. 
21 The Development Credit Authority is an US government-funded agency providing credit guarantee to local commercial 
banks that provide finance to creditworthy but underserved private enterprises in developing countries (USAID 2011).  
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fertilizer prices. High transport costs result from several components: roadblocks (for inspection and 
clearance), an escort system for cross-border movement, a quota system for truckers, the lack of 
competition among truckers, taxes and levies, an old trucking fleet, and poor road conditions. A recent 
study (Annequin et al. 2010) analyzing the various hurdles estimated that on the Tema–Ouagadougou 
corridor transportation costs could be reduced by $77 a ton if a number of improvements were made 
(Table 6.3).  
A World Bank study also provides stark evidence of high profit margins among trucking 
companies in West Africa (Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2009). The study estimated profit margins of 
up to 80 percent on the Tema–Ouagadougou and Tema–Bamako corridors. Additionally, it found that 
actual costs (fixed and variable costs) are not exceedingly higher than those found in Europe (here using 
the example of France). 
Table 6.2—Potential savings from harmonization of cotton formula in West Africa, preliminary 
estimates (2000 prices, US$) 
Activity/Element  Potential Savings 
Nonspecialty product effect  30–40 
Scale effect 
         Production 




Local bagging (bulk imports)  8–12 
Local blending 
a (bulk import of raw materials)  30–35 
Improvements in marketing  15–20 
Source: IFDC 2003. 
Note:
 a Local blending of cotton formula should use boron-based material or use boron through foliar application (2000 prices). 
Port Handling and Bagging 
Inefficiencies at various ports in West Africa include limited berth space (causing delays in unloading 
cargo and increased stevedoring charges), the monopoly of the port authority in bagging or of unions in 
discharging and moving product to storage, and limited discharge rates. For example, at a discharge rate 
of 1,000 tons a day it takes 20 days to unload a cargo of 20,000 tons, adding demurrage charges. Such 
inefficiencies not only add to the cost of the product but also cause delays in moving the product. At the 
same time, inefficiencies of land-based transportation and distribution networks, which serve the port, can 
also lead to higher port handling and storage costs (also see Harding, Palsson, and Raballand 2007, a 
World Bank study on the state of maritime ports in West Africa). 
Table 6.3—Potential cost savings on Tema–Ouagadougou transportation corridor 
  Activity  Cost Saving (US$) 
1.  Deregulation of West Africa trucking market  $25.20 
2.  Removal of informal charges (corruption)  $13.69 
3.  Speed up custom inspections at Ouagarinter  $11.16 
4.  Create a single West Africa trucking market  $9.19 
5.  Create more berth space for container operations at Tema port  $7.78 
6.  Other improvements in port and in-transit operations and tax structure  $10.29 
  Total  $77.31 
Source: Annequin et al. 2010.  
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Limited Agrodealer Networks in Rural Areas 
The capacity for well-functioning markets is restricted. Most of the agrodealers are concentrated in urban 
or peri-urban areas, so farmers in remote rural areas do not have access to inputs. Moreover, from the 
small importers and wholesalers to the table-top stockists who sell small quantities of such inputs as seed, 
chemicals, and fertilizer, few are well equipped with knowledge of business management, financial 
planning, and the technical aspects of inputs.  
Demand-Side Considerations 
Whereas supply-side constraints have affected fertilizer use in much of Africa through high fertilizer 
prices and limited physical availability and quality, demand-side constraints, especially those associated 
with the broader constraints affecting agricultural intensification in Africa as discussed earlier in Section 
2, can prevent wider adoption of fertilizers. 
Fertilizer Recommendations 
In many countries, fertilizer recommendations are based on work done during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, but crop and soil conditions have changed significantly. Farmers in Ghana say that fertilizer 
recommendations based on NPK 15-15-15 are not relevant to current soil conditions. Outdated fertilizer 
recommendations combined with poor-quality blended NPK fertilizers have created a lack of confidence 
among smallholder farmers (Fuentes, Bumb, and Johnson 2010a and 2010b). Here the role of research 
and extension is important, especially in developing appropriate fertilizer recommendations and farming 
practices suitable for different agro-ecological zones and farming systems, something ECOWAS, with the 
participation of CORAF/WECARD, is already pursuing. 
Inadequate Research and Extension Support 
Fertilizer is typically most effective when combined with improved seeds and farming practices. 
Therefore, efforts to increase fertilizer demand must be part of an overall agricultural intensification 
strategy—one that also involves R&D and the transfer of improved seeds, agronomic practices, and other 
technologies (for example, during postharvest). Unfortunately, investment in R&D has never returned to 
its highs in the 1970s and 1980s in many countries in West Africa. SAPs imposed soon after that 
effectively reduced the size of research and extension facilities in order to cut government fiscal spending. 
As a result, there is limited capacity to educate farmers about proper use of fertilizers and other necessary 
inputs. Although agrodealers have been trained in recent years to teach farmers about the right types of 
products, demand for such assistance is much greater than the available supply.  
Inadequate Access to Financing or Credit 
Access to credit and cash resources is a critical determinant for fertilizer use (Kelly 2006; Croppenstedt, 
Demeke, and Meschi 2003; Marinho 2004). Although export crop producers and large-scale commercial 
farmers face no problems borrowing funds from commercial banks, smallholder farmers, especially those 
growing staple foodcrops, often cannot get financing because of high interest rates and stringent collateral 
requirements. Moreover, the lack of financial institutions in rural areas also makes it difficult to access 
funds for inputs. Some countries have tried microfinance institutions, but the duration of the loan and the 
high interest rate do not suit the seasonal requirements of smallholder farmers.  
Other types of institutions, such as producer associations and cooperatives, can play a key role at the farm 
level by helping reduce transaction costs (for example, in obtaining price information, knowledge and 
skills, and access to financing) and promoting trust and improved market coordination (Dorward et al. 
2004; Fafchamps and Minten 1999; Gabre-Madhin 2001). Unfortunately, such institutions are weak in 
many rural areas in West Africa (as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa).  
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Underdeveloped Output Markets 
Studies done around the world have typically shown that farmers are far more responsive to changes in 
output prices than changes in input prices (Kelly 2006). Therefore, having access to a sufficiently large, 
stable market reduces the risks associated with output price variability. Smaller, underdeveloped output 
markets on the other hand exhibit higher price volatility. Bumper harvests can flood the market quickly, 
leading to a price collapse and the inability of farmers to sell their crop. This ultimately creates 
disincentives to use yield-enhancing technologies in future years. Therefore, linking smallholder farmers 
to larger domestic markets (for example, urban or high-population-density areas) and regional markets 
(such as through greater cross-border trade) is essential for increasing fertilizer demand. 
Production Risk 
As most smallholder farmers in West Africa depend on rainfed agriculture, adequate and consistent 
rainfall reduces the risk of applying productivity-enhancing inputs such as fertilizer. Because rainfall 
uncertainty is particularly high in the Sahel, investments in fertilizer are often unprofitable for many 
farmers (Marinho 2004). A recent study in Ethiopia (Alem et al. 2010) underscored the enormous 
importance attached to weather, especially as it relates to determining not only current productivity but 
also future investments.  
Limited Purchasing Power 
It is true that many viable smallholder farmers would use more fertilizer if they had access to seasonal 
finance and output markets to sell their crops at remunerative prices. However, there are many vulnerable 
farmers who produce for home consumption and do not sell in the market or sell only a fraction of their 
output. The risks associated with not having enough food to eat can be quite high, especially in locations 
with unpredictable rainfall, causing households to be less likely to adopt fertilizer (Dercon and 
Christiaensen 2010). Targeted poverty- and hunger-reduction measures, such providing purchasing power 
support for production inputs, can help lift some of the most resource-poor farmers out of their poverty 
trap and allow them to be included in the marketplace. An assessment of various poverty-reduction 
programs indicated that purchasing power support for inputs (seed and fertilizers) was the most cost-
effective program in reducing hunger among vulnerable households in Malawi (Dorward et al. 2008, 
Brewin 2005). 
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7.  POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
We offer a number of options and recommendations to facilitate the improvement of fertilizer markets in 
West Africa with the goal of encouraging greater fertilizer use and productivity growth in the region. A 
key recommendation that comes out of this work is no different from past recommendations: improve the 
supply of fertilizer at both the macro and micro levels as a critical first step. This would help not only by 
lowering fertilizer prices at the farmgate but also by removing problems that emerge as a result of 
inadequate supplies to begin with, such as high fiscal costs and rent-seeking behavior from fertilizer 
subsidies (Larson and Frisvold 1996; Gregory and Bumb 2006; Morris et al. 2007). Because of the critical 
role fertilizer supply plays in improving fertilizer use and agricultural growth, we pay special attention to 
policy, institutional, and infrastructural issues affecting that supply at both the regional and national 
levels. 
Increasing fertilizer availability, especially among a majority of the smallholder farm population, 
will require a range of both policy-related and institutional and infrastructure-type interventions (at both 
the national and regional levels). Based on recommendations and the results from our assessment of 
current conditions of fertilizer markets in the region, we propose a way forward that involves the 
strengthening of efforts by ECOWAS and its development partners in the establishment of a common 
fertilizer market in West Africa. 
Creating a Policy Environment Conducive to Fertilizer Market Development 
National governments, development partners, and ECOWAS should work together to create policy 
environments that promote the development of regional and national fertilizer markets, by considering the 
following actions:  
•  Do away with direct government procurement of fertilizers for fertilizer support programs.  
•  Implement targeted fertilizer subsidy programs by using voucher systems, with an adequate 
monitoring system in place, appropriate financial arrangements (for example, have 
agrodealers redeem vouchers at the local level to ensure the supply line is not choked by 
unnecessary delays as has occurred in Nigeria and Ghana), and exit plans. 
Many countries introduced subsidies during the 2007–2008 fertilizer crisis. With the changing 
global fertilizer situation, we recommend that national governments consider revisiting the commitment 
to subsidies and instead convert them into targeted purchasing-power-support subsidies for the most 
vulnerable but viable smallholder farmers. Ideally, such support should be fiscally sustainable and have 
clear sunset clauses to avoid creating the dependency syndrome among beneficiaries. Ultimately, the goal 
for national governments should be to refrain from interfering in national and regional fertilizer markets 
in such a way that crowds out private importers and agro-dealers.  
Improving Efficiencies along the Supply Chain  
Removing Tariff and Nontariff Barriers 
The presence of existing national tariffs, nontariff controls, and taxes at border crossings prevents the free 
flow of goods across national boundaries—adding to the costs of inputs, especially for landlocked 
countries. Therefore, at the regional level, input markets must become part of any overall liberalization 
and harmonization efforts being promoted under the Common Agricultural Policy in the ECOWAS 
region. More specific for fertilizer markets, this would involve  
•  harmonizing subsidy rate policies across member states so that fertilizer can be traded without 
borders;  
•  implementing zero duty on imported fertilizer; and 
•  convincing national governments to exempt fertilizer from other unnecessary taxes and levies at 
national levels.   
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Although removing tariffs and taxes will cause a loss of revenue for national governments, the 
losses in forgone crop output are likely to be far greater. For example, a simple calculation shows that $1 
collected in tariffs or taxes on fertilizer causes a loss of $3 to $4 in foregone crop output (based on the 
authors’ own calculations). Other sources of revenue (including a tariff on final products) may need to be 
explored to make up the loss of income from removing tariffs and taxes on fertilizer. Moreover, although 
ECOWAS member states have agreed to a common external tariff of zero percent on imported fertilizers, 
some countries have not yet implemented this rule. At the same time, many governments continue to 
impose other taxes, such as a value-added tax (VAT) of up to 18 percent on inputs (including fertilizers). 
Therefore, in addition to having no duty on imported fertilizers, other unnecessary taxes and levies, 
including VATs, should be discouraged among member states.  
Improving Port Operations 
Given the inefficiencies observed in the country case studies, we suggest the following policy actions. 
First, allow the private sector, to the extent possible, to make arrangements for bagging and transporting 
fertilizer from the port. Second, following a detailed assessment, make an investment to improve 
discharge rates (for example, from 1,000 to 3,000 tons per day) and demurrage and stevedoring charges. 
Finally, remove the burden of unnecessary inspections and paperwork at the port. 
Removing Transportation Bottlenecks 
As mentioned earlier, roadblocks on multicountry corridors add unnecessary costs and delays to the 
movement of fertilizer products. Given that the cost of transportation accounts for more than a third of the 
retail fertilizer price in landlocked countries, the improvement of transportation services and the 
liberalization of the trucking industry should receive priority (Annequin et al. 2010). Based on several of 
the country case studies, policy options include (a) remove the roadblocks and the escort systems; (b) 
explore the feasibility of treating the ECOWAS region as a single fertilizer market with one-stop 
inspections at major ports for multicountry haulage as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) and  the East African Community (EAC) are doing; (c) eliminate country quotas for 
trucking services and integrate the trucking sector among ECOWAS member states; and (d) improve 
efficiencies along some of the major trade corridors, such as the Dakar–Bamako railway line, to allow 
bulk movement of fertilizer products (we discuss this further in the next subsection). 
Development of Efficient Trade Corridors 
Although efforts would be needed on several fronts to create a common fertilizer market, priority should 
be given to removing critical distortions and roadblocks along the following four transport corridors: the 
Dakar–Bamako corridor; the Abidjan–Ouagadougou–Bamako corridor; the Tema–Ouagadougou–Niamey 
corridor; and the Lagos–Kano corridor. These corridors cover all of the landlocked countries and account 
for more than 90 percent of the fertilizer imported in the region. Improving efficiencies at ports and along 
transport routes along these corridors would help in creating a common market by reducing costs and 
delays in supplying fertilizer to member states.  
Figure 7.1 illustrates how the trade corridors link the landlocked and coastal countries. 
Considering that market access and populations tend to be densely clustered along these corridors (in 
addition to others not shown), improving marketing and transportation efficiencies along the corridors not 
only would reduce input prices, but even more importantly would stabilize output prices through greater 
market penetration and integration (especially for food staples). A detailed feasibility study would 
identify pressure points along these routes and estimate the investments needed to usher in improvements. 
Such a study should also consider options for outlier markets, further from the corridors.  
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Exploring the Feasibility for Regional Fertilizer-Holding Warehouses 
To benefit from economies of scale in procurement, and therefore reduced prices, international suppliers 
and national governments may wish to jointly explore the feasibility of establishing a few regional 
holding warehouses to be considered as free trade areas among the major ports of entry in West Africa, 
such as Dakar (already a free trade area), Abidjan, Tema, and Lagos. As free trade areas, such warehouses 
would enable small local importers in both landlocked and coastal countries to get fertilizer at competitive 
global prices. Typically, even though smaller importers face difficulties in accessing financing for large-
scale imports from global suppliers, they could potentially benefit from such holding warehouses. 
However, further research and a pre-feasibility study would be required to explore this in more detail. The 
hypothesis is that expected benefits would include an expanded regional market, lower prices, and 
improved efficiencies in the timely supply of fertilizer among both coastal and landlocked countries. To 
avoid potential conflicts of interest, global or regional suppliers involved in the holding warehouse 
scheme should not be allowed to participate in the wholesale or retail business at the country level.  
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Pre-feasibility studies have been conducted in the other regions. For example, a recent study by 
IFDC on establishing a regional fertilizer-holding warehouse at the port of Beira in Mozambique 
recommended establishing such a warehouse in a public–private partnership mode (IFDC 2008). Key 
stakeholders endorsed that recommendation in Maputo, Mozambique, in March 2008 and during a Private 
Sector Round Table on Expanding Fertilizer Markets in Africa in Lusaka, Zambia, in June 2008. Based 
on the study, Yara International recently decided to build such warehouses in Beira and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania. The governments of Mozambique and Tanzania subsequently allocated lands to Yara for the 
construction. Although the Beira warehouse project is still under consideration, Yara has since committed 
$20 million to build the warehouse in Dar es Salaam (see Harding 2011 for details). Similar pre-
feasibility studies would be needed to establish such warehouses in key ports in West Africa. 
Rationalizing Fertilizer Policies, Products, and Institutional Arrangements 
Rationalizing Fertilizer Recommendations 
To improve on outdated and uniform fertilizer recommendations developed during the 1970s and 1980s, 
resources should be devoted to new trials and soil testing for developing area- and crop-specific 
recommendations. Special attention should be paid to nutrient depletion and changing the cropping mix 
over time. For the new fertilizer products, national governments should coordinate adequate seeding 
programs and educational efforts with regional R&D collaborative efforts, via, for example, 
CORAF/WECARD. 
Rationalizing Fertilizer Products 
A study should be commissioned to rationalize NPK fertilizer products across national boundaries, 
simplifying the number to a few key products that can be more easily traded across the region. First, areas 
in countries that share similar soils and agroecologies should agree to do away with artificial product 
differentiation, a phenomenon that exists in the region (see Table 3.2 for cotton, for example). A technical 
study would determine which specific products can benefit from greater rationalization. This would allow 
economies of scale in the production and procurement of specific blends and could even lead to 
investments in their production. In Mali, for example, the existence of high-quality Tilemsi phosphate 
rock may encourage bulk movement of complementary fertilizers from Dakar to Bamako, but only 
following improvements in the existing railway line.  
Second, the production of granulated or blended products in the region would potentially allow 
for larger-scale imports of straight fertilizers such as urea, DAP, and MOP. This in turn would generate 
further savings in procurement prices and, more important, allow for the development of fertilizer markets 
for foodcrops. Foodcrop production has traditionally been neglected in receiving fertilizer treatments 
under custom-made fertilizer imports for export crops.  
Strengthening Regulatory Systems 
Finally, establishing uniform standards for the quality control of fertilizer products is going to be critical. 
As part of the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy, ECOWAS has begun to develop the 
regional regulation of fertilizer quality and to establish the Regional Committee on Fertilizer Control and 
Labeling; both initiatives are intended to encourage the harmonization of regulatory systems across West 
Africa. However, to reiterate their importance, we recommend that the following areas receive priority 
attention: 
•  strengthening quality control systems at the national and regional levels, which will require the 
capacity to enforce the laws;  
•  investing in building the necessary cadre to enforce quality control standards and truth in labeling 
at the point of sale;  
•  investing in building regional laboratories for testing of fertilizers when and where needed; and 
•  establishing uniform standards for quality control of fertilizer products among countries.   
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Overall, because financial and human resource capacity gaps exist among countries in the region, 
implementing these priorities will require significant capacity-building efforts and adequate funding, 
especially for national regulatory services and self-monitoring. We further discuss the need to strengthen 
human and institutional capacities below. 
Improving Access to Finance and Marketing Services 
To improve access to finance, shown by the country case studies to be a serious constraint, we suggest the 
following actions: (a) establish risk management funds to encourage commercial banks to finance 
fertilizer imports and marketing, especially for small agrodealers (the Development Credit Authority loan 
guarantee system could be used to jump-start the process); (b) promote the use of credit insurance 
schemes to lower the risk of loan default for commercial banks; (c) promote the use of warehouse 
collateral for fertilizer imports as is done in Senegal; (d) encourage warehouse receipt systems to allow 
smallholder farmers to access credit from local banks; and (e) conduct training and capacity building for 
bank staff to learn about the fertilizer business. 
The smooth flow of information about prices, stocks, sales, deliveries, and farmer demand among 
different markets is essential for improving the functioning, efficiency, and integration of regional 
markets. To improve market information and strengthen business linkages among importers, wholesalers, 
retailers, and farmers, the establishment and operation of market information and transparency systems 
should be strengthened at both national and regional levels. This would require training participating 
agrodealers to furnish information about prices, stocks, and sales and establishing the hardware and 
software for collecting and disseminating market information. In this vein several regional efforts are 
under way, including at the country level, and we should support or complement them. Creating broader 
Africa-wide linkages, such as with other regional economic communities, could provide important 
synergies in creating greater transparency of market information across regional markets. In this context, 
ongoing efforts under AGRIS by ECOWAS and AMITSA by EAC and COMESA should be strengthened 
and harmonized so that importers, agrodealers, farmers and policymakers have access to information on 
an Africa-wide scale and can benefit from each other’s experiences.  
Strengthening Human and Institutional Capacity 
Capacity-building and training programs are needed in diverse areas, such as good management practices, 
market information, how to strengthen business and market linkages, and marketing and technical skills. 
The programs should include diverse actors, such as policymakers, extension agents, agrodealers, and 
farmers. Intercountry linkages for training purposes would be particularly beneficial, including those 
intended to encourage private-sector importers to pool their orders in order to benefit from economies of 
scale and develop multicountry markets. Programs designed to help link importers with global suppliers 
can strengthen ties and establish closer business linkages and solutions. Finally, periodic policy 
workshops, seminars, and study tours involving policymakers and other stakeholders would help improve 
policy dialogue.  
Demand-Side Considerations 
Encouraging farmers to use improved technologies and purchased inputs, such as fertilizer, should be 
integrated with efforts to improve supply-side efficiencies. To do this, we suggest a number of 
investments. First, improving linkages between farmers and input and output markets is critical. 
Institutions play a key role at the farm level by helping reduce transaction costs and promote trust, which 
helps expand production and marketing possibilities. Simply improving the link between smallholder 
farmers and increasingly integrated supply chains can dramatically increase a farmer’s access to input and 
output markets. Improved links are possible through a variety of institutional arrangements such as 
producer associations, farmer groups, and cooperatives (Haggblade and Hazell 2010).
22 However, the 
                                                      
22 It should be pointed out, however, that top-down interventions to encourage the formation of farmer groups have been 
relatively ineffective, whereas the few groups that have emerged from bottom-up initiatives have been more sustainable and more  
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type of institutions and market linkages will vary by crop—such as between high-value export crops and 
food staples. In cash crop production, for example, interlocking contracts between farmers (or farmer 
groups) and buying firms have played an especially important role in providing farmers access to credit 
and inputs (seed and fertilizer) and output markets, and especially in reducing market price risks. Care 
needs to be taken to ensure a strong producer role in the process.  
Second, to strengthen R&D systems in the region while taking advantage of similar 
agroecological zones that stretch beyond national borders, resources should be provided for adaptive 
research and transfer of improved technologies across countries, including best farming practices and use 
of modern inputs. The technologies should be ones that have wider spillover potential and greater regional 
welfare implications. A study carried out for CORAF/WECARD’s R&D priority-setting exercise offers a 
useful starting point (see Johnson et al. 2008).  
Finally, here are some important considerations for improving extension and technology transfer: 
(a) support research and extension to educate farmers about new fertilizer products and recommendations; 
(b) develop “seeding” programs to demonstrate the use of new fertilizer products on a large scale; (c) 
train agrodealers to disseminate knowledge about new agricultural practices and link them with subject 
matter specialists to upgrade their skills on new technologies and agronomic practices; and (d) promote 
other proven natural resource management techniques (for example, integrated soil fertility management).  
Exploring the Establishment of a Common Fertilizer Market  
Critical among the many policy recommendations reviewed above are the market development elements 
of creating an enabling policy environment, developing human capital, improving access to finance, 
facilitating market information and business linkages, and enforcing quality regulations. The good news is 
that many efforts are already under way to solve some of these constraints. For example, ECOWAS (and 
UEMOA) are well aware of the policy issues, tariffs/taxes, quality issues, market information system 
needs, and transportation bottlenecks, among other things, that the region faces in the development of its 
agro-input markets. Efforts by them and others in the region—such as the West Africa Trade Hub, the 
Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (ATP) project, and the ECOWAS/UEMOA MIR Plus project—are 
taking place at the regional level. Some such efforts are by nature long term as they require consensus 
across member states (for example, for policy harmonization), while others are expensive and take a long 
time (for example, infrastructure and port development). However, more could be done by exploring 
further the extent to which the ECOWAS region can strive toward creating a common fertilizer market for 
West Africa in the future.  
A common fertilizer market for West Africa will become more realizable if current efforts at 
promoting synergies across national and regional input markets can be maintained. How to go about 
establishing such a common market, nevertheless, is going to require more detailed assessments by 
ECOWAS, member states, and development partners. The goal of such assessments would be to explore 
the feasibility and appropriate courses of action. ECOWAS is already laying the groundwork, beginning 
with the adoption of a Common Agricultural Policy, coming to an agreement with UEMOA on a common 
protocol on seed testing and certification, and establishing a common external tariff regime. With 
subsequent measures, such as a regional legal framework for agro-input trade, such changes will even 
further strengthen the regional markets. 
To help create and coordinate further synergies across various efforts, one option to consider 
would be the establishment of a regional fertilizer alliance
23 that can work directly with ECOWAS, 
national governments, the private sector, and other stakeholders to help (a) promote a policy environment 
conducive to national and regional fertilizer markets; (b) provide technical advice on business (for 
example, by helping small importers and agrodealers establish links with large importers and global 
suppliers to improve access); (c) link entrepreneurs to commercial and development banks to improve the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
likely to engage in interlocking contracts (World Bank 2007). 
23 Similar efforts have been established in the past for seeds, for example. See the West Africa Seed Alliance at 
http://www.cnfa.org/our-work/our-programs/65-west-african-seed-alliance-wasa (accessed 2/3/2011).  
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supply of financing for fertilizer import, marketing, and distribution (for example, by exploring various 
risk management instruments to encourage commercial banks to lend to fertilizer entrepreneurs and link 
up with the Development Credit Authority credit guarantee system); (d) broaden and deepen ongoing 
efforts for collecting and disseminating market information and strengthening market linkages; (e) build 
and strengthen capacities through training, workshops, seminars, and study tours; and (f) foster policy 
dialogue among all public and private stakeholders.  
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8.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We must address many of the policy recommendations presented in the previous section if we are going 
to improve the efficiencies of fertilizer markets and boost the use of fertilizer in West Africa. Critical 
among those are the key market development elements—creating an enabling policy environment, 
developing human capital, improving access to finance, facilitating market information and business 
linkages, and enforcing quality regulations—and they need to be promoted in a holistic manner in order to 
create synergies across countries. Fragmented approaches in the past have focused on one or two tasks 
and did not produce significant lasting results. 
If only one key recommendation is to emerge from this review, it is that ECOWAS, development 
partners, and national policymakers should strive to create a common fertilizer market for West Africa 
considering the small size of fertilizer markets at the country level (except Nigeria), especially if current 
efforts to promote synergies in market development can be maintained at both the national and regional 
levels. This is because the region can gain large economies of scale and efficiency improvements in 
marketing and distribution from promoting a common market. This is not to suggest that efforts to 
improve the functioning of fertilizer markets at the national level will no longer be needed. On the 
contrary, how well individual country markets integrate into a larger regional one will depend on the 
success of these national-level efforts. Ultimately, a successful integration at the regional level will yield 
larger potential benefits than the sum of the national ones. Therefore, efforts to improve the performance 
of national markets should complement the development of a regional common fertilizer market.  
But doing this will require a concerted effort among the member states of ECOWAS and their 
development partners to undertake a more detailed feasibility study in order to decide on an appropriate 
course of action for a common regional fertilizer market. The good news is that policymakers, 
development partners, the private sector, and the farming community, in West Africa and other regions in 
Africa, recognize that creating regional common markets is essential for accelerating future economic 
growth, poverty reduction, and food security. On July 1, 2010, for example, the East African Community 
member states signed a protocol to create a common market for East Africa. COMESA is working on 
removing tariff and nontariff restrictions on the movement of goods to create larger markets for 
commodities. ECOWAS has already agreed to a zero external tariff on imported inputs and a Common 
Agricultural Policy and has initiated the process of establishing common norms for fertilizer regulation 
and labeling. UEMOA and ECOWAS have agreed to a common protocol on seed and CPP testing and 
certification. The foregoing are important building blocks for creating a common fertilizer market, one 
that can ultimately harness the benefits of lower fertilizer prices and improved accessibility by 
smallholder farmers.  
Finally, we can expect the gains to be had from taking advantage of economies of scale in 
fertilizer production and procurement and removing cross-border hurdles and distortions, as a common 
fertilizer marker would strive to do, to be quite large. Market transaction costs would be reduced, while 
access to global fertilizer markets and good-quality fertilizer products would be expected to improve for 
small importers and wholesalers, as well as millions of smallholder farmers. This should lead to lower 
prices and higher growth rates in the derived demand for fertilizers and other complementary technologies 
in the region. This should then result in increased yields, sector and income growth, and food security. 
But whereas such an argument is compelling, further research is needed to substantiate the extent of these 
economic gains, including the short- and long-run priority interventions needed to develop a regional 
common fertilizer market. That should include assessing the investments and policy reforms needed to 
usher in improved transportation and marketing efficiencies along some of the major trade corridors, and 
it should explore the possibility of building regional fertilizer-holding warehouses at some of the major 
ports of entry (Dakar, Abidjan, Tema, and Lagos). Because not all countries within the region may derive 
full benefits from a common fertilizer market, further research is also recommended to explore how to 
improve linkages with smaller national markets, such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as to 
examine the likely distribution of impacts, especially among resource-poor smallholder farmers.   
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